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FAITHFULLY EXECUTING THE LAWS:
INTERNAL LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON EXECUTIVE POWER
Dawn E. Johnsen
Since September 11, 2001, the Bush Administration has engaged in a host
of controversial counterterrorism actions that threaten civil liberties and even the
physical safety of those targeted: enemy combatant designations, extreme
interrogation techniques, extraordinary renditions, secret overseas prisons, and
warrantless domestic surveillance. To justify otherwise unlawful policies,
President Bush and his lawyers have espoused an extreme view of expansive
presidential power during times of war and national emergency. Debate has
raged about the details of desirable external checks on presidential excesses, with
emphasis appropriately on the U.S. Congress and the courts. Yet an essential
internal source of constraint is often underestimated: legal advisors within the
executive branch. On a daily bass, the President must engage in decisionmaking
that implicates important questions of constitutionality and legality. Whether to
seek congressional authorization before engaging in war, what limits to set (and
respect) on interrogation techniques, when to publicly release information
regarding security efforts-all are issues over which the President exercises
enormous practical control, and all can profoundly affect individual lives
and the course of history. This Article examines executive branch legal
interpretation: How can internal interpretive processes and standards foster or
undermine adherence to the rule of law? What may be gleaned from recent
failures? How might the courts and Congress not only hold Presidents
accountable for particular failures to uphold the law, but also encourage
processes that generally enhance the quality of executive branch legal advice and
decisionmaking? This Article takes as its principal example the Bush
Administration's interrogation policies. It considers past failures and, looking
forward, what standards should govern the faithful execution of the laws.
It builds upon a statement of Principles to Guide the Office of Legal
Counsel, in which nineteen former Office of Legal Counsel lawyers set forth
the best of longstanding practices in an effort to promote presidential fidelity to
the rule of law.
* Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; Acting Assistant
Attorney General (1997-98), Deputy Assistant Attorney General (1993-96), Office of Legal
Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice. I owe many thanks for helpful suggestions to David Barron,
Curtis Bradley, Walter Dellinger, John Hamilton, Neil Kinkopf, Martin Lederman, Sanford
Levinson, Trevor Morrison, Cornelia Pillard, Eric Posner, and H. Jefferson Powell, and to my
outstanding research assistants Jeffrey Macey and Aaron Stucky.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Bush Administration
has engaged in a host of controversial counterterrorism actions that
threaten civil liberties and at times even endanger the physical safety of the
targeted individuals. Prominent examples include the detention of enemy
combatants, the use of extreme interrogation techniques and even torture,
extraordinary renditions, secret overseas prisons, and warrantless domestic
surveillance. To justify policies that would otherwise violate applicable
legal constraints, President Bush and his lawyers have espoused an
extreme view of expansive presidential power during times of war and
national emergency, a view that draws especially on the President's
constitutional role as commander-in-chief. For those who believe that the
Bush Administration has misinterpreted relevant constitutional authorities,
particularly when seeking to justify actions otherwise prohibited by law, the
War on Terror brings new urgency to old questions: What can be done to
prevent presidential aggrandizement and abuse of power including in the
most trying of times, when the nation is at war or serious external threats
otherwise threaten national security? What in our constitutional system
can help t9 ensure that Presidents will respect the rule of law and adhere to
constitutional and statutory limits on their national security policy options?
The most obvious checks on the President are the other two branches
of the federal government: the U.S. Congress and the courts. Our constitu-
tional system of separate and overlapping powers creates the potential for a
vibrant legislature and judiciary to check a President who transgresses legal
1560
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boundaries and violates rights in order to accomplish policy ends.' Debate
has raged, domestically and internationally, about the details of desirable
external checks on the Bush Administration's counterterrorism policies.
While the Republicans controlled Congress prior to 2007, most attention
understandably focused on the courts, with commentators differing
passionately about the level of deference the courts should afford the
political branches2 and about the judiciary's potential to safeguard civil
liberties in times of emergency.' Thus far, the U.S. Supreme Court has
taken a relatively aggressive and nondeferential stance in favor of protect-
ing those whose rights the President's policies may have violated.4 The
Court's approach is warranted: Regardless of the underlying policies'
substantive merits, the courts as well as Congress should hold the President
1. As James Madison wrote in The Federalist Papers, "the great security against a gradual
concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who
administer each department, the necessary constitutional means, and personal motives, to
resist encroachments of the others." THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 267, 268 (James Madison)
(George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001). The constitutional structure affords the
three branches-Madison's "departments"--considerable authority and means for checking
each others' excesses and safeguarding their own powers against encroachment. Additional
pressures come from outside the government: public opinion, American voters, advocacy
organizations, foreign nations, and the press.
2. See, e.g., Derek Jinks & Neal Kumar Katyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 116
YALE L.J. 1230 (2007); Julian Ku & John C. Yoo, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Functional Case for
Foreign Affairs Deference to the Executive Branch, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 179 (2006); Eric
A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1170 (2007).
The Bush Administration has consistently urged the U.S. Supreme Court either to accord
the President extreme deference or to refuse even to hear challenges to executive branch
action on matters of national security. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 527 (2004)
(plurality opinion) (citing the government's brief urging extreme deference to the President's
enemy combatant determinations in light of "[riespect for separation of powers and the
limited institutional capabilities of courts in matters of military decision-making"); see also
Alberto R. Gonzales, Att'y Gen., Remarks at the American Enterprise Institute (Jan. 17,
2007), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/newsroom/Gonzalez_l 1707.pdf ("[A] judge will never
be in the best position to know what is in the national security interests of our country.").
3. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK: PRESERVING CIVIL
LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM (2006); David Cole, Judging the Next Emergency:
Judicial Review and Individual Rights in Times of Crisis, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2565 (2003); Oren
Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?, 112
YALE L.J. 1011 (2003); William E. Scheuerman, Emergency Powers, 2 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI.
257 (2006); Mark Tushnet, Defending Korematsu?: Reflections on Civil Liberties in Wartime, 2003
WIS. L. REV. 273.
4. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (holding that the Bush Administration's
military tribunals violated applicable law and that Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions applies to al Qaeda, notwithstanding Bush's conclusion to the contrary); Rasul v.
Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (holding that, as the law was then, the writ of habeas corpus
extended to the petitioner prisoners at Guantanamo); Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 507 (plurality
opinion) (holding that the government must provide a citizen it seeks to imprison as an "enemy
combatant" with an opportunity to challenge the detention before a neutral decisionmaker).
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accountable for attempts to implement policies with arrogant disrespect for
legal constraints and for the coordinate branches' constitutional authorities.
Our recent history, though, has demonstrated the inherent inade-
quacies of the courts and Congress as external checks on the President. An
approach of issue-by-issue review and oversight even by a vigilant
judiciary and Congress will incompletely constrain a President who, in
the name of national security, is willing to undermine the rule of law.
This Article therefore seeks to elevate an essential source of constraint that
often is underappreciated and underestimated: legal advisors within the
executive branch.
The obstacles to judicial or congressional review of particular
executive branch actions on matters of war and national security-
especially during times of crisis-are familiar. The courts face (and create)
difficult justiciability requirements, in part out of respect for executive
authority and expertise. These impediments to judicial review mean, for
example, that there may be no party who ever has standing to challenge
a clearly unlawful governmental action. Courts may deny or delay relief
even to parties with standing because of the political question doctrine,
the state secrets privilege, deferential standards of review, or years of
complex litigation.
With regard to Congress, oversight obviously tends to be least effective
when the President's political party dominates, but even with the shift to
Democratic control in 2007, significant obstacles remain to Congress's
ability to check executive action. Congress tends to defer strongly to the
commander-in-chief on matters of war and national security even in times
of divided government. Legislative efforts face the possibility of a filibuster
or a presidential veto.
Perhaps the greatest challenge to legislative oversight is that Congress
has already enacted legislation with regard to many of the Bush
Administration's most objectionable policies. Much of the controversy in
fact stems from President Bush's claimed authority to refuse to comply with
congressional statutes, including the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(FISA),5 the anti-torture statute,6 and the numerous other laws that are
5. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1862 (2000 & Supp. II 2002); see also U.S. Dep't of Justice, Legal
Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National Security Agency Described by the President, 81
IND. L.J. 1374 (2006).
6. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (2000). Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att'y
Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Justice to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the
President, Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (Aug. 1,
2002) [hereinafter Torture Opinion or Opinion], available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/nation/documents/dojinterrogationmemo20020801.pdf.
1562
Faithfully Executing the Laws 1563
the subjects of signing statements in which Bush asserts the right to refuse
to enforce the laws in ways that conflict with his view of his office's
constitutional authority When Congress already has legislated and the
President unjustifiably threatens nonenforcement, Congress is left with
the options of resource-intensive oversight to attempt to police
compliance, indirect retribution (such as through appropriations and
appointments), and the blunt instrument of impeachment.
Executive branch secrecy further hinders both judicial and congres-
sional review. At times, of course, secrecy is essential to preserving national
security, but the Bush Administration has taken the level of executive
branch secrecy to a new and unwarranted extreme. By its nature, secrecy
undercuts the efficacy of external checks. Congress or potential litigants
may not even know about unlawful executive action unless someone in the
government violates administration policy, and perhaps statutory
prohibitions, to leak information. Such leaks were responsible for the public
disclosure of the Bush Administration's legal opinions and policies on
coercive interrogations and torture,8 the National Security Administration's
domestic surveillance program that operated outside the requirements of
FISA,9 and the use of secret prisons overseas to detain and interrogate
suspected terrorists. Ultimately, even with the current Supreme Court's
relatively strong willingness to protect rights in the face of unlawful
executive action, coupled with scrutiny from the press and advocacy
organizations, the Bush Administration has engaged in years of largely
unconstrained illegal practices.
7. See T.J. HALSTEAD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. REPORT FOR CONG., PRESIDENTIAL
SIGNING STATEMENTS: CONSTITUTIONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS (2007);
Phillip J. Cooper, George W. Bush, Edgar Allan Poe, and the Use and Abuse of Presidential
Signing Statements, 35 PRES. STUD. Q. 515 (2005); Charlie Savage, Bush Challenges Hundreds
of Laws: President Cites Powers of His Office, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 30, 2006, at Al. The Bush
Administration sometimes declares a law unconstitutional and unenforceable to the extent
it conflicts with the President's asserted constitutional authority, but more often the admini-
stration announces it will "interpret" the law-often inconsistently with the best reading of
the text and legislative intent-to avoid a conflict with the administration's expansive view of the
President's powers. For insightful discussions of the legitimacy of the executive branch's reliance
on the constitutional avoidance doctrine, see Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in
the Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1189 (2006), and H. Jefferson Powell, The Executive
and the Avoidance Canon, 81 IND. L.J. 1313 (2006).
8. See Dana Priest & R. Jeffrey Smith, Memo Offered Justification for Use of Torture,
WASH. POST, June 8, 2004, at Al.
9. See James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at Al.
10. See Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons, WASH. POST, Nov. 2,
2005, at Al.
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On a daily basis, the President engages in decisionmaking that
implicates important questions of constitutionality and legality.
Whether to seek congressional authorization before committing the
nation to war or other hostilities, what limits, if any, to set (or when
set by Congress, to respect) on torture and other coercive interrogation
techniques, when to publicly release information regarding the course
of war or counterterrorism efforts-all are issues over which the
President exercises enormous practical control, and all can profoundly
affect individual lives and the course of history. The possibility of
after-the-fact external review of questionable executive action is an
inadequate check on executive excesses. Presidents also must face
effective internal constraints in the form of executive branch
processes and advice aimed at ensuring the legality of the multitude of
executive decisions.
The proposition that the President's own legal advisors can provide
an effective constraint on unlawful action understandably engenders a
high degree o6f skepticism-especially in light of recent events. One of
President Bush's legacies undoubtedly will be the deepening of Americans'
cynicism about presidential adherence to the rule of law. The Bush
Administration, however, also provides some evidence to the contrary,
for example, in the resistance to advice given by the U.S. Department of
Justice's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) regarding torture from lawyers
and other advisors elsewhere in the executive branch and later from
within OLC itself." Internal checks alone, of course, are insufficient.
But we debase our commitment to democracy and justice if we do not
view legal advice from within the executive branch as an essential
component of efforts to safeguard civil liberties, the constitutional alloca-
tion of governmental authority, and the rule of law. We invite failure
if we allow our cynicism to excuse presidential abuses as simply
expected-in effect relieving Presidents (and those who serve them) of
their obligation to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, as the
U.S. Constitution commands.
11. See infra notes 45, 53, 54 and text accompanying note 53. On a related issue, the
Department of Justice stood strong against President Bush and others in the White House on
the legality of an early, apparently even more egregiously unlawful, version of the warrantless
domestic surveillance program. Deputy Attorney General James Comey and the rest of the
Department's top leadership stood firm, unwilling to approve the program even when then-
Counsel to the President Alberto Gonzales sought to pressure a critically ill Attorney General
John Ashcroft into approving the program. See Dan Eggan & Paul Kane, Gonzales Hospital
Episode Detailed, WASH. POST, May 16, 2007, at Al.
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This Article therefore considers questions of executive branch legal
interpretation. How can internal interpretive processes and standards
foster or undermine adherence to the rule of law? What norms and proce-
dures should govern executive action? What may be gleaned from recent
strains and failures? How might the courts and Congress not only hold
Presidents accountable for particular failures to uphold the law, but
also encourage processes that generally enhance the quality of executive
branch legal advice and decisionmaking?
Presidential failures to comport with the law can be found throughout
history, from administrations of both political parties, often on matters of
war powers. This Article examines one particularly illuminating context
in which to consider the necessity of internal legal constraints: The Bush
Administration's controversial positions regarding the interrogation of
detainees suspected of terrorism. The administration continues to withhold,
in the name of national security, information and documents critical to
a thorough review of these policies, but much is now publicly known. Most
infamously, government lawyers in OLC gave executive branch policymakers
dangerously flawed advice in the early months after the September 11
attacks regarding the legality of using torture to acquire information from
detainees. 2  Although the substance of the advice has been almost
universally condemned, and the Bush Administration publicly disavowed
the advice after it was leaked, the failures that led to this debacle
demand far greater scrutiny, both to determine accountability for past
misdeeds and to promote future legal compliance.
Congress created a new urgency for that scrutiny by enacting the
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA) l3 and the Military Commissions
Act of 2006 (MCA), 4 legislation that, in many circumstances, deprives the
federal courts of jurisdiction to hear complaints of torture and other illegal
interrogations by the U.S. government. Through these laws, Congress
prohibited the government from subjecting any person to torture or cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment. Congress, though, acceded to the Bush
Administration's demands to limit dramatically the possibility of judicial
review in the event the government violates those prohibitions or inter-
prets them out of existence. For noncitizens whom the government
imprisons outside of U.S. territory, the legality of the conditions of their
12. See Torture Opinion, supra note 6.
13. Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739 (2005) (to be codified in scattered sections of 10,
28, and 42 U.S.C.).
14. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006) (to be codified in scattered sections of 10,
18, 28 and 42 U.S.C.).
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confinement and interrogation depends more than ever on the executive
branch's internal decisionmaking processes."
Part I of this Article reviews the Bush Administration's interrogation
policies and Congress's responses. Part I examines the standards and
processes that should govern the legal advice that informs executive branch
action. Taking as its principal example the formulation of detainee
interrogation policy, it considers past failures and, looking forward, what
standards should govern the faithful execution of laws such as the DTA and
the MCA. Part II also endorses and builds upon a short statement of
Principles to Guide the Office of Legal Counsel,6 reprinted in the appendix
following this Article, in which nineteen former OLC lawyers set forth the
best of longstanding practices in an effort to promote presidential fidelity to
the rule of law. Finally, it calls for the Bush Administration and all subse-
quent administrations either to endorse those principles or develop their
own; and it urges a congressionally led public dialogue about the proper
role of presidential lawyers.
1. LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON INTERROGATION DURING
THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION
The images of U.S. soldiers abusing detainees at the Abu Ghraib
prison in Iraq are well recognized and easily recalled. The celebratory
photographs taken by those involved in the abuse, made public in April
2004, horrified the world. The United States' enemies, including those
who engage in terrorism, used the photographs to mobilize support and
attract new recruits."
Shortly after the release of the Abu Ghraib photographs, someone
leaked to the press an August 2002 legal memorandum in which OLC
advised then-Counsel to the President Alberto Gonzales on the meaning of
the federal statute" that makes it a crime to commit torture (Torture
Opinion or Opinion).'9 Congress had enacted the 1994 statute to implement
15. That is, unless or until the Supreme Court rules that the Military Commissions Act
of 2006 (MCA) violates a constitutional right to habeas corpus. See Boumediene v. Bush, 476
F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 2007 WL 1954132 (June 29, 2007) (No. 06-1195)
(holding that the detainees at the Guantanamo Bay military prison possess no right to petition
for a writ of habeas corpus and suggesting that they possess no rights under the U.S. Constitution).
16. WALTER E. DELLINGER, DAWN JOHNSEN ET AL., PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE THE OFFICE
OF LEGAL COUNSEL (2004) [hereinafter GUIDELINES], reprinted in 54 UCLA L. REV. 1559 app. 2.
17. See Philip Carter, The Road to Abu Ghraib, WASH. MONTHLY, Nov. 2004, at 25.
18. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (2000).
19. Torture Opinion, supra note 6.
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the terms of a recently ratified treaty, the Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment." The Torture Opinion,
though, goes to great lengths first to read the scope of the statute in an
exceedingly narrow manner and then to methodically explore all conceiv-
able arguments whereby persons who engage in aggressive interrogations-
including torture-can escape conviction.
The timing of the leak of the Torture Opinion-in the immediate
wake of the Abu Ghraib scandal-almost certainly was not coincidental.
The critical open question at the time was whether the detainee abuse
could be attributed to official policies of the U.S. government, as opposed
to, as the Bush Administration claimed, "a few American troops who
dishonored our country and disregarded our values."'" Although no direct
links have been proven between the Torture Opinion and those later
convicted of the abuse," the Opinion suggested a broader problem of
aggressive circumvention of torture prohibitions that went beyond isolated
bad apples, thereby undercutting the official explanations and inflicting
tremendous harm on the United States' reputation.23
A. OLC on the Legality of Torture
Numerous commentators have described, analyzed, and almost invaria-
bly criticized the Torture Opinion.24 The Opinion begins by interpreting
20. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOc. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into
force June 26, 1987) [hereinafter Convention Against Torture].
21. George W. Bush, President, Remarks on Iraq and the War on Terror at the U.S. Army War
College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania (May 24, 2004), in 40 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 944, 947 (2004).
22. Nine soldiers have been convicted for their role in the Abu Ghraib prison abuses. See
The Abu Ghraib Files: Prosecutions and Convictions, SALON, Mar. 14, 2006, http://www.salon.com/
news/abu.ghraib/2006/03/14/prosecutionsconvictions/index.html.
23. For a fascinating and detailed account of the development of the Bush Administration's
interrogation policy, see Jane Mayer, The Memo: How an Internal Effort to Ban the Abuse
and Torture of Detainees Was Thwarted, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 27, 2006, at 32.
24. For an outstanding compilation of posts on the Torture Opinion and related issues,
see Postings of Jack Balkin, Martin Lederman et al. to Balkinization, The Anti-Torture
Memos: Balkinization Posts on Civil Liberties, the War on Terror and Presidential Power,
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2006/12/anti-torture-memos.html (Dec. 22, 2006) [hereinafter The
Anti-Torture Memos]. Academic scholars have been critical of the Torture Opinion since
the time of its release. See Adam Liptak, Legal Scholars Criticize Memos on Torture, N.Y. TIMES,
June 25, 2004, at A14. The literature addressing the Opinion and its consequences is
voluminous. See, e.g., David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, 91 VA. L. REV.
1425 (2005); Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 1681 (2005); W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics and the Separation of Law and
Morals, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 67 (2005); Symposium, War, Terrorism and Torture: Limits on
Presidential Powerfor the Twenty-First Century, 81 IND. L.J. 1355 (2006).
the meaning of torture as limited to the most extreme of acts: "The victim
must experience intense pain or suffering of the kind that is equivalent to
the pain that would be associated with serious physical injury so severe that
death, organ failure, or permanent damage resulting in a loss of significant
body function likely will result."25 The pain must be "excruciating and
agonizing. ' '16 Mental pain or suffering "must result in significant psycho-
logical harm of significant duration, e.g., lasting for months or even years.""
The infliction of such pain must be the defendant's precise objective; it
is not enough that the defendant knew that such pain and suffering were
28reasonably likely to result from his actions.
Even more controversial and ominous, the Torture Opinion goes on to
suggest that even acts that come within this extremely crabbed definition of
torture could not be successfully prosecuted. OLC made the extraordinary
claim that, notwithstanding its facially clear application to government
actors, the statute could not be interpreted to allow the prosecution of
someone who commits torture "pursuant to the President's constitutional
authority to wage a military campaign," because to do so would interfere
with the President's commander-in-chief power. The Opinion broadly
asserts that "Congress may no more regulate the President's ability to detain
and interrogate enemy combatants than it may regulate his ability to direct
troop movements on the battlefield. 29 As Yale Law School dean and profes-
sor Harold Hongju Koh put it, the claim seems to be that commander-
in-chief means unassailable "Torturer in Chief."3  In exaggerating the
President's war powers, the Opinion ignores entirely Congress's textually
committed war powers31 and fails even to cite a directly relevant watershed
Supreme Court opinion, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, in which
Justice Jackson's famous concurring opinion sets forth the now-prevailing
standards regarding congressional authority to limit presidential authority. 2
Finally, the Torture Opinion crafts creative defenses to "eliminate
criminal liability" in the event that "an interrogation method ... might
25. Torture Opinion, supra note 6, at 13.
26. Id. at 19.
27. Id. at 1.
28. Id. at 3-4.
29. Id. at 35.
30. Harold Hongju Koh, Can the President Be Torturer in Chief?, 81 IND L.J. 1145 (2006).
31. Among the congressional war powers the Opinion fails to acknowledge are the
authority to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces, U.S.
CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 14; to declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules
concerning captures on land and water, id. at cl. 11; and to define and punish piracies and
felonies committed on the high seas and offenses against the law of nations, id. at cl. 10.
32. 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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arguably cross the line [into an act of torture] ... and application of the
statute was not held to be an unconstitutional infringement of the
President's Commander-in-Chief authority." A defense of necessity would
argue that torture-notwithstanding the statute's prohibition-was
necessary to gain information to prevent a future terrorist attack: The harm
of torture "would pale to insignificance compared to the harm avoided
by preventing such an attack."" Similarly, the Opinion argues that a
torturer could claim to have acted in self-defense: not the traditional
defense of one's self, but an extension to defense of one's nation. The
Opinion concludes that these defenses might justify interrogation methods
that constitute torture. 4
The Torture Opinion focuses exclusively on just one statutory
prohibition, which could give the impression that interrogations that fall
just short of the Opinion's narrow interpretation of torture are not
unlawful. In fact, several other laws further prohibit coercive forms of
interrogation that would fail to meet even a broad definition of torture.
The soldiers who committed the Abu Ghraib abuses, for example, were
subject not only to the limits of the federal anti-torture statute, but also to
far more extensive restrictions contained in the Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ)," most notably prohibitions against cruelty, oppression, or
maltreatment of a detainee.36 The anti-torture statute itself implements a
treaty that prohibits "cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment."37 A final
example: Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions goes far beyond
torture and prohibits "violence to life and person, in particular murder of all
kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture," and "outrages upon
personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment., 39 At
the time of the Torture Opinion's issuance, violations of Common Article 3
were punishable war crimes under federal law.4"
Marty Lederman led the early effort to solve the mystery of why the
Torture Opinion, without explanation, addressed only one of many
restrictions on interrogation methods-and why the government cared so
33. Torture Opinion, supra note 6, at 41.
34. Id. at 39-46.
35. 10 U.S.C. § 801 (2000).
36. Id. § 893.
37. Convention Against Torture, supra note 20.
38. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention 1].
39. Id.
40. 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2000). The MCA subsequently limited the War Crimes Act in this
regard. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
1569
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much about clarifying the difference between torture and other prohibited
forms of interrogation. Lederman authored a series of extraordinary posts
on Balkinization, Yale Law School professor Jack Balkin's prominent blog,
that have greatly assisted observers trying to make sense of the torture issue
in the face of the Bush Administration's intense secrecy.41 Lederman
deduced that in requesting the Torture Opinion, the administration did not
have the military in mind at all, but instead the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), for which it was seeking maximum flexibility-that is, the
ability to use the most extreme methods possible without risking criminal
liability-in interrogations of suspected al Qaeda operatives held at
locations outside the United States.42 The administration elsewhere had
interpreted all potentially relevant limitations, save the federal anti-
torture statute, as inapplicable to CIA interrogators in such circumstances:
The UCMJ by its own terms does not apply outside the military, and the
administration took the controversial position that the protections in the
Geneva Conventions do not apply to al Qaeda detainees.43 In subsequently
opposing congressional efforts to enact new prohibitions on highly coercive
interrogation methods, the Bush Administration confirmed its desire to
allow CIA extraterritorial interrogations to continue unrestricted, and
President Bush personally acknowledged the existence of secret "black
sites" overseas where such interrogations took place.'
The Torture Opinion's extreme reading of the President's commander-
in-chief power as overcoming a statutory prohibition on torture by its
terms also could overcome the many other laws that prohibit highly
coercive forms of interrogation. The Bush Administration refuses to reveal
whether it actually has relied on such arguments and which interrogation
techniques it has authorized. At times, President Bush and others in the
41. See The Anti-Torture Memos, supra note 24.
42. See Posting of Marty Lederman to Balkinization, Understanding the OLC Torture
Memos (Part II), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2005/01/understanding-olc-torture-memos-part.html
(Jan. 8, 2005); Posting of Marty Lederman to Balkinization, Understanding the OLC Torture
Memos (Part 1II), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2005/01/understanding-olc-torture-memos-part_07.html
(Jan. 8, 2005).
43. Memorandum from President George W. Bush to Vice President Dick Cheney et al.,
Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees, (Feb. 7, 2002) [hereinafter Bush Memo
Re: Treatment of al Qaedal, available at http://www.gwu.edu/%7Ensarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/
02.02.07.pdf.
44. Michael A. Fletcher, Bush Defends CIA's Clandestine Prisons, WASH. POST, Nov.
8, 2005, at A15; Glenn Kessler, Rice Defends Tactics Used Against Suspects, WASH. POST,
Dec. 6, 2005, at Al; Eric Schmitt, Senate Moves to Protect Military Prisoners Despite Veto
Threat, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2005, at A22; see also Posting of Marty Lederman to Balkinization,
Judge Gonzales' Senate Responses, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2005/01/judge-gonzales-senate-
responses.html (Jan. 18, 2005).
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administration have implicitly denied that they acted upon the authority
OLC claimed for the President. As soon as the Opinion leaked in June
2004, Bush and others-in the face of scathing criticism--disavowed the
Opinion and declared that the U.S. government does not torture people."
With regard to detainees held by the U.S. Armed Forces, Bush had
issued a directive on February 7, 2002 that went further and required the
military to treat detainees humanely.'
Bush's humane treatment directive did not extend to the CIA,
however, and he has vigorously opposed congressional efforts to protect
detainees from any extreme interrogation methods at the hands of the
CIA. The government has repeatedly refused to confirm or deny the
methods the CIA uses, citing concern that potential detainees could
prepare for those methods if they know about them.47 However, news
reports based on interviews with former and current CIA officers describe
six "enhanced interrogation techniques" instituted in March 2002 and used
on suspected top members of al Qaeda incarcerated in secret locations
outside the United States. They include "the cold cell," in which the
prisoner is stripped naked, repeatedly doused with cold water and held in
a cell kept near fifty degrees, and "waterboarding," in which the prisoner
is smothered with water to make him feel he is drowning." Both the cold
cell and waterboarding have reportedly resulted in the deaths of prisoners
at the hands of CIA agents.49
Moreover, the military, both before and after the humane treatment
directive, sanctioned interrogation methods that could not possibly be
45. President Bush declared: "America stands against and will not tolerate torture. We
will investigate and prosecute all acts of torture ... in all territory under our jurisdic-
tion.... Torture is wrong no matter where it occurs, and the United States will continue to
lead the fight to eliminate it everywhere." George W. Bush, President, Statement on United
Nations International Day in Support of Victims of Torture (June 26, 2004), in 40 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 1167, 1167-68 (2004). The press has reported that even prior to the leak,
a new head of the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), Jack Goldsmith, took a more moderate view
of presidential power and initiated a review of OLC's prior counterterrorism advice. See
Michael Isikoff & Evan Thomas, Bush's Monica Problem: The Gonzales Mess, NEWSWEEK, June 4,
2007; Daniel Klaidman et al., Domestic Spying: Bush Appointees Revolt, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 6, 2006.
46. Bush Memo Re: Treatment of al Qaeia, supra note 43.
47. Carol D. Leonig & Eric Rich, U.S. Seeks Silence on CIA Prisons, WASH. POsT, Nov. 4,
2006, at Al.
48. Brian Ross & Richard Esposito, CIA's Harsh Interrogation Techniques Described,
ABC News, Nov. 18, 2005, http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/lnvestigation/story?id=1322866
("The prisoner is bound to an inclined board, feet raised and head slightly below the feet.
Cellophane is wrapped over the prisoner's face and water is poured over him. Unavoidably,
the gag reflex kicks in and a terrifying fear of drowning leads to almost instant pleas to bring
the treatment to a halt.").
49. Id.
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described as humane.0 On December 2, 2002, U.S. Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld approved a long list of techniques for detainees held at
the U.S. military prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba including forced nudity
and the use of attack dogs to induce panic.5' After some lawyers and others
in the executive branch raised serious concerns about the severity of interro-
gations at Guantanamo, a U.S. Department of Defense working group
began studying the range of permissible interrogation methods. The
working group issued a report on April 4, 200352 that recommended
retention of these and other extreme methods, but only after the working
group was directed that it had to rely on OLC's legal interpretations and
over the objections of working group members and military lawyers,
including U.S. Navy General Counsel Alberto Mora.53 In addition to the
Torture Opinion, OLC issued a more specific opinion dated March 14,
2003-which the government still refuses to release to the public-that
apparently authorized the military to use extreme interrogation techniques
that are inconsistent with applicable legal prohibitions, presumably under
the same sweeping interpretation of the commander-in-chief power
adopted in the Torture Opinion.1
4
50. The U.S. government not only has engaged directly in inhumane interrogations
of suspected terrorists, it also has deported suspected terrorists for questioning to countries known
to engage in torture and other cruel and inhumane practices in a program known as "extraordi-
nary renditions." See Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship & Immigration), 2007 SCC 9, 29-30,
[2007] S.C.J. No. 9 QUICKLAW (Feb. 23, 2007); Ian Austen, Canada Will Pay $9.75 Million to
Man Sent to Syria and Tortured, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2007, at A5; Jane Mayer, Outsourcing
Torture, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 14, 2005, at 106; Testimony Is Said to Implicate C.I.A. in Seizure
of Suspect in Italy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2007, at A5. But see Interview of the Vice President by
Scott Hennen, WDAY at Radio Day at the White House (Oct. 24, 2006), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/10/20061024-7.html (Vice President Cheney
suggested in a radio interview that waterboarding is a "no-brainer" and does not constitute torture).
51. Memorandum from General Counsel William J. Haynes, II to Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld, Counter-Resistance Techniques, (Nov. 27, 2002) (signed "approved" Dec. 2,
2002), available at http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.12.02.pdf.
52. DEP'T OF DEF., WORKING GROUP REPORT ON DETAINEE INTERROGATIONS IN
THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM: ASSESSMENT OF LEGAL, HISTORICAL, POLICY, AND
OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS (Apr. 4, 2003) [hereinafter DOD WORKING GROUP REPORT],
available at http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/03.04.04.pdf.
53. See Mayer, supra note 23 (describing internal opposition to the Torture Opinion and
the Bush Administration's severe interrogation policies and practices, highlighting the early
and consistent opposition of U.S. Navy General Counsel Alberto Mora); Josh White,
Military Lawyers Fought Policy on Interrogations, WASH. POST, July 15, 2005, at Al (also discussing
internal opposition).
54. Although the March 14, 2003 OLC opinion remains secret, the working group
report reveals its existence. See DOD WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 52. Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld issued a more moderate memorandum on April 16, 2004 that approved
twenty-four of the thirty-five techniques identified by the working group. Memorandum
from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to the Commander, U.S. Southern Command
On December 30, 2004, six months after the leak and public disavowal
of the Torture Opinion, OLC issued a new opinion (Replacement Opinion)
that provides a more careful and accurate analysis of the federal anti-torture
statute. OLC also uses a far more appropriate tone, opening with a
statement that torture is "abhorrent""' and acknowledging early on that
many other sources of law regulate the detention and interrogation of
detainees. 7 Rather than craft creative potential defenses, the Replacement
Opinion states: "There is no exception under the [federal anti-torture]
statute permitting torture to be used for a 'good reason.""'5  It also drops
entirely discussion of the claimed commander-in-chief authority to torture
notwithstanding the statutory prohibition, though it does not disavow
that authority. Indeed, the Bush Administration has endorsed the same
exceedingly broad view of presidential war powers in other contexts
before and since.59 The definition of torture remains extremely narrow, and
a footnote reassures recipients of earlier OLC advice-namely, the CIA-
that the changes in analysis and tone do not affect the bottom line:
"While we have identified various disagreements with the August 2002
Memorandum, we have reviewed this Office's prior opinions addressing
issues involving treatment of detainees and do not believe that any of
their conclusions would be different under the standards set forth in
this memorandum." 6
B. Congressional Responses
Congressional concern about the Bush Administration's interrogation
practices eventually resulted in the enactment in 2005 of the DTA.61 In
sweeping language that unequivocally applies equally to the CIA and
(Apr. 16, 2004). Newsweek has reported that in December 2003, a new assistant attorney general
for OLC, Jack Goldsmith, informed the Department of Defense (DOD) that it had reconsidered
the March 2003 opinion and DOD could no longer rely upon it. Klaidman, supra note 45.
55. Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Att'y Gen. Office of Legal
Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Justice to James B. Comey, Deputy Att'y Gen., Legal Standards
Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (Dec. 30, 2004) [hereinafter Replacement Opinion],
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/18usc23402340a2,htm.
56. Id. at 1.
57. Id. at 2 n.6 (citing, for example, the Geneva Conventions, the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 801 et seq., the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3261-3267, and the War Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2441).
58. Id. at 17.
59. See sources cited supra notes 5, 7.
60. Replacement Opinion, supra note 55, at 2 n.8.
61. Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739 (2005) (to be codified in scattered sections of 10,
28, and 42 U.S.C.).
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the military, the DTA declares: "No individual in the custody or under
the physical control of the United States Government, regardless of nation-
ality or physical location, shall be subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment."62  President Bush had vigorously opposed the
enactment of any such protections for many months, but he changed his
position in the face of overwhelming congressional and popular support.63
Although he could not stop the bill entirely, President Bush successfully
lobbied Congress to add provisions that protect from liability those who
engage in cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment in violation of the law. 4
One section creates a defense in cases in which the accused did not know
the practices were unlawful; good faith reliance on counsel is designated
as an important factor in establishing the defense.65 Other provisions deprive
the courts of jurisdiction to hear challenges brought by alien detainees
at Guantanamo to the conditions of their detention, including detainees
subjected to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.66 Even with these
governmental protections, when signing the DTA into law, President Bush
issued a signing statement that appeared to claim the right as commander-
in-chief not to comply with the law.67
The Supreme Court interpreted the DTA in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld6
and held that the jurisdiction-stripping provisions did not apply retro-
actively to preclude review of a case that was filed before the law's
enactment. 69 Hamdan also specifically addressed the lawfulness of the
military commissions established to try the Guantanamo detainees. In
the course of deciding that issue, the Court held-contrary to the Bush
62. Id. § 1003 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd).
63. See Schmitt, supra note 44.
64. Id.
65. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA), § 1004(a), 119 Stat. at 2739 (to be codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd).
66. Id. § 1005(a), (e) (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 801 and 28 U.S.C. § 2241). The DTA
defines "cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment" narrowly, as limited to what the Due Process
Clause would prohibit, which is a "shocks the conscience" standard. Id. § 1003(d) (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd). It also establishes an exclusive review process that includes
an appeal to the D.C. Circuit, but only for challenges related to the determination of the
status of the alien being detained. Id. § 1005(e) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241).
67. George W. Bush, President, Statement on Signing the Department of Defense,
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and
Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006 (Dec. 30, 2005), in 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1918, 1919
("The executive branch shall construe [the provision] relating to detainees, in a manner
consistent with the constitutional authority of the President to supervise the unitary execu-
tive branch and as Commander in Chief and consistent with the constitutional limitations
on the judicial power ....").
68. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
69. Id. at 2764.
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Administration's position-that the protections of Common Article 3 of
the Geneva Conventions70 apply to al Qaeda.7' Hamdan thereby threatened
not only the Guantanamo military commissions, but also the admini-
stration's CIA extraterritorial interrogation program by suggesting that the
government could not violate Common Article 3's prohibitions against
"cruel treatment and torture" and "humiliating and degrading treatment.""'
Congress responded in 2006 with the MCA,73 which in part repudiates
Hamdan. The MCA does not take the extreme step-one that might
have sparked an international crisis-of challenging the applicability of
Common Article 3. Rather, the MCA limits the applicability of Article 3
only for purposes of what actions are subject to criminal sanctions, includ-
ing what constitutes grave breaches.74 Even as it limits remedies, the MCA
repeats the DTA's prohibition on "cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment"
of any person in U.S. custody anywhere in the world.7" But it interprets-
many would say misinterprets-such prohibited treatment in an extremely
narrow fashion and, beyond that, it expressly leaves considerable interpre-
tive authority to the President.7 1 It expands the jurisdiction-stripping
provisions of the DTA and makes clear they operate retroactively to
deprive courts of jurisdiction even in pending cases (including in Hamdan
itself on remand). 7 And it flatly prohibits any person from invoking the
Geneva Conventions as a source of rights in any U.S. court in any habeas
corpus or other civil action in which the United States or any U.S.
personnel is a party, thereby leaving compliance in the largely unreviewable
hands of the executive."8
On its face, the MCA's likely effect on checking extreme forms of
interrogation would seem mixed. The MCA does impose genuine limits on
permissible interrogation techniques (though those limits might not coin-
cide with the proper interpretation of Common Article 3).79 The President
has a clear constitutional obligation to take care that CIA interrogations-
even those performed overseas-of those suspected of terrorism do not
70. Geneva Convention III, supra note 38.
71. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2795-96.
72. Id.
73. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006) (to be codified in scattered sections of 10,
18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
74. Id. § 6(b)(1) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2441).
75. Id. § 6(c) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 200Odd-0).
76. Id. § 6(a)(3) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2441).
77. Id. § 7(a)-(b) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(1)-(2), (nt)).
78. Id. § 5 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(nt)).
79. Id. § 3 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 948r).
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violate legal prohibitions that now include "cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment" as well as the protections of Common Article 3. That would
seem to present a problem for the CIA interrogation program, which in
the past reportedly has not met those standards and has included, for
example, the near drowning of detainees through waterboarding. And
yet, notwithstanding years of strenuous opposition to such restrictions,
the Bush Administration celebrated the MCA as a great success and
claimed it did not interfere with the CIA program. Press coverage con-
firms the consensus view that with the MCA, Bush "achieved a signal
victory."" By depriving the victims of illegal interrogations of judicial
recourse to vindicate their rights, the MCA leaves great discretion with
the executive branch to monitor itself. That is cause for grave concern,
given the Bush Administration's history of disregard for legal limits on
detainee interrogations and its claims that the CIA program survives
intact." The enactment of the MCA thus highlights the enormous
importance of internal standards and processes to promote the legality
of executive branch action.
II. GUIDELINES FOR RENDERING LEGAL ADVICE TO THE PRESIDENT
The Torture Opinion thrust into the public eye a previously obscure,
though enormously influential, office within the Department of Justice:
the Office of Legal Counsel. The constitutional text and structure make
plain the President's obligation to act in conformity with the law and to
ensure that all in the executive branch do the same as they perform myr-
iad responsibilities. To fulfill their oath of office82 and obligation to "take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,"83 Presidents require a reliable
source of legal advice. In recent decades OLC has filled that role. Thus, OLC's
core function is to provide the legal advice that the President-and, by
extension, the entire executive branch-needs to faithfully execute the laws.
80. Scott Shane & Adam Liptak, News Analysis: Shifting Power to a President, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 30, 2006, at Al.
81. See Editorial, Guilty Until Confinned Guilty, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2006, at All
(describing the MCA's utter lack of remedies and external checks, and concluding that "[e]ven
if our system were based on that sort of personal power and not the rule of law, it would be hard
to trust the judgment of a president and an administration whose records are so bad").
82. The Constitution provides that the President must take an oath to "preserve, protect
and defend the Constitution." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
83. Id. art. II, § 3. The President's responsibility to uphold the rule of law through the
supervision of all who exercise executive authority would be apparent even if not made
explicit in the Take Care Clause.
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OLC functions as a kind of general counsel to the numerous other top
lawyers in the executive branch who tend to send OLC their most difficult
and consequential legal questions.84 OLC's staff of about two dozen lawyers
(most of whom are career employees, led by several political appointees)
responds to legal questions from the counsel to the President, the attorney
general, the general counsels of the various executive departments and
agencies, and the assistant attorneys general for the other components of
the Department of Justice. A relatively high percentage of OLC's work
comes from the White House or otherwise involves the White House.
Regulations require the submission of legal disputes between executive
branch agencies to OLC for resolution." By virtue of regulation and
tradition, OLC's legal interpretations typically are considered binding
within the executive branch, unless overruled by the attorney general or
the President (an exceedingly rare occurrence). 86
OLC's advice therefore ordinarily must be followed by the entire
executive branch, from the counsel to the President and cabinet officers
to the military and career administrators, regardless of any disagreement
or unhappiness. The President, however, may overrule the advice
through formal means or simply by declining to follow it. To take a quasi-
hypothetical example, if the CIA wanted to use waterboarding to interro-
gate a detainee but the Department of Justice's criminal division and the
U.S. Department of State believed that doing so would be illegal, OLC
would resolve that dispute. The CIA would be bound by an OLC conclu-
sion that waterboarding was unlawful. The President or attorney general
could lawfully override OLC only pursuant to a good faith determination
that OLC erred in its legal analysis. The President would violate his consti-
tutional obligation if he were to reject OLC's advice solely on policy grounds.
84. OLC lawyers are usually extraordinarily well credentialed; among those who have
served as assistant attorneys general leading OLC are Justice Scalia, former Chief Justice
Rehnquist, and other prominent lawyers, judges, and legal academics.
85. Exec. Order No. 12,146, 3 C.F.R. 409, 411 (1980); see also 28 C.FR. § 0.25 (2006)
(delineating the responsibilities delegated by the attorney general to OLC).
86. The literature on executive branch legal interpretation is vast and expanding,
including scholarship regarding the standards that should govern OLC as it informs the legality
of executive action. See, e.g., Dawn E. Johnsen, Functional Departmentalism and Nonjudicial
Interpretation: Who Determines Constitutional Meaning?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer
2004, at 105; Morrison, supra note 7; Randolph D. Moss, Executive Branch Legal Interpretation: A
Perspective From the Office of Legal Counsel, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1303 (2000); Cornelia T.L. Pillard,
The Unfulfilled Promise of the Constitution in Executive Hands, 103 MICH. L. REV. 676 (2005);
Symposium, Executive Branch Interpretation of the Law, 15 CARDOZo L. REV. 21 (1993). My
descriptions of the work of OLC are supported by these publications and further are based on
my experience serving in that office from 1993 to 1998, first as deputy assistant attorney
general and then as acting assistant attorney general heading OLC.
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Of course, even if OLC were to find waterboarding lawful, the President or
other appropriate officials could make the policy determination not to use
it as a method of interrogation. The President or the attorney general also
could disagree with OLC's interpretation of the relevant law and prohibit
waterboarding on legal grounds.
Former OLC lawyers, understandably, paid special attention when
the Torture Opinion was leaked. Many were deeply outraged and sad-
dened by what they saw as a dramatic and dangerous deviation from the
office's tradition of accurate and principled legal advice. These concerns
inspired nineteen OLC alumni to coauthor a short statement of the core
principles that should guide the formulation of legal advice regarding
contemplated executive action." Their statement of ten principles, issued
in December 2004 and entitled Principles to Guide the Office of Legal Counsel
(Guidelines), affirmatively describes how OLC should function. The
Guidelines do not criticize or even mention the Torture Opinion (or any
other specific opinion),88 but they provide an extremely useful basis for
evaluating both the process failures that led to the Torture Opinion and
the processes that should govern, for example, the executive branch's
interpretation and enforcement of the DTA and the MCA.
The Torture Opinion is an easy target for criticism, an extreme
example of poor lawyering. 9 A strong case can be made that the Opinion
does not meet the professional standards that define any transactional
attorney's ethical obligations in advising a client.' More difficult than
87. GUIDELINES, supra note 16, app. 2 at 1603.
88. The memorandum that accompanied the transmittal of the statement to the attorney
general explained that it was prompted in part by concerns about the Torture Opinion.
Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Dawn Johnsen et al. to John Ashcroft, Att'y Gen., et al.
(Dec. 21, 2004), reprinted in 54 UCLA L. REV. 1559 app. 1.
89. Harold Hongju Koh has gone as far as to testify before the U.S. Congress: "[Iln
my professional opinion, the August 1, 2002 OLC Memorandum is perhaps the most
clearly erroneous legal opinion I have ever read." Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of
Alberto R. Gonzales to Be Attorney General of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
109th Cong. 158 (2005) (statement of Harold Hongju Koh, Dean, Yale Law School).
90. See, e.g., Wendel, supra note 24, at 120 ("Some measure of aggressiveness is permissible
in litigation because of the checking mechanisms built into the adversary system .... Similarly,
certain kinds of administrative proceedings.., are accompanied by procedural checks .... In
transactional representation, however, these checks and balances are absent, and the lawyer
in effect assumes the role of judge and legislator with respect to her client's legal entitle-
ments."). Wendel cites the Model Rules of Professional Conduct for support, in particular
its statements that lawyers shall not "take positions that lack an adequate basis in law and
fact," "knowingly fail to disclose adverse authority," or "knowingly make misstatements of
fact." Id. at 120 n.199 (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1, R. 3.3(a)(2) & R.
3.3(a)(1) (1980)).
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chronicling the Opinion's flaws, however, is creating meaningful standards
to govern OLC lawyers in order to avoid future mistakes of this kind.
This Article focuses on the obligations of OLC and other government
lawyers as they relate especially to the context of serving as legal advisor to
the President. That context complicates the articulation of general stan-
dards. In describing the appropriate interpretive stance for advising the
President, OLC lawyers, past and present, might be tempted to resort to an
"I know it when I see it" test and urge that the best training for new OLC
lawyers comes from actual exposure to the office's traditions.9 The Torture
Opinion, though, demonstrates that not all OLC lawyers "see it" the same
way. The power of unwritten tradition alone plainly is inadequate.
The Guidelines represent one valuable attempt to articulate standards
for rendering legal advice to executive officials. They are aspirational in
the sense that they describe best practices for OLC, albeit practices that
have not invariably been followed. Deviations undoubtedly can be found
in many administrations, often on matters concerning presidential power
during times of war or national emergency, when pressures against legal
adherence are greatest. But the Guidelines also are realistic in the sense
that they intentionally were drawn to reflect "the longstanding practices of
the Attorney General and the Office of Legal Counsel, across time and
administrations."92 This Article's conclusions are consistent with the
Guidelines, reprinted in their entirety following this Article, and in some
instances expand on them in the same spirit of promoting adherence to
the rule of law.
A. OLC's Interpretive Stance: Accuracy Versus Advocacy
The Guidelines' first principle articulates OLC's appropriate interpre-
tive stance when formulating advice to "guide contemplated executive
branch action."9 Where the law is clear-that is, where only one reasonable
interpretation exists-virtually all would agree that the President must
91. Cf. Nelson Lund, The President as Client and the Ethics of the President's Lawyer,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 1998, at 65, 80 ("For some government lawyers,
especially the political appointees in the Department of Justice and the White House, the
ordinary rules of professional ethics are not so useful. The genuinely difficult questions
about right and wrong that they're most likely to face . . . are inevitably going to be resolved,
not by professional ethics, but by personal standards of integrity and by... bargaining with
their appointing official, the President.").
92. GUIDELINES, supra note 16, app. 2 at 1604.
93. Id.
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adhere to it.9 4 Questions typically end up at OLC, though, when what
the law requires is not entirely clear and the President or other execu-
tive branch officers care about the answer. In these cases, what should
be OLC's interpretive stance? Should OLC routinely provide legal
opinions that set forth the strongest plausible arguments supportive of
the desired policies, following what can be described as an advocacy
model? Or should OLC strive for what it considers an accurate and
honest appraisal of the relevant legal constraints?
The Guidelines come down squarely on the side of accuracy over
advocacy, and most of its ten principles follow from and elaborate on the
Guidelines' first and most fundamental principle:
OLC should provide an accurate and honest appraisal of applicable
law, even if that advice will constrain the administration's pursuit of
desired policies. The advocacy model of lawyering, in which lawyers
craft merely plausible legal arguments to support their clients' desired
actions, inadequately promotes the President's constitutional obliga-
tion to ensure the legality of executive action.95
In short, OLC must be prepared to say no to the President. For OLC
instead to distort its legal analysis to support preferred policy outcomes
would undermine the rule of law and our democratic system of govern-
ment. The Constitution expressly requires the President to "take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed." This command cannot be reconciled
with executive action based on preferred, merely plausible legal inter-
pretations that support desired policies, rather than an attempt to achieve
the best, most accurate interpretations-especially when the enforce-
ment of a federal statute is at stake. For OLC to present merely
plausible interpretations framed as the best interpretations would, as the
Guidelines acknowledge, "deprive the President and other executive
branch decisionmakers of critical information and, worse, mislead them
regarding the legality of contemplated action., 96  Alternatively, if such
94. The principle that the rule of law should constrain the President is virtually univer-
sally accepted, albeit not invariably followed. Perhaps the most infamous statement to the
contrary came in a 1977 interview of President Nixon about the Watergate scandal. David
Frost said to Nixon, "[slo what in a sense you're saying is that there are certain situations ... where
the president can decide that it's in the best interests of the nation or something, and do
something illegal." Nixon responded, "[wihen the President does it that means that it is not
illegal." Interview by David Frost with Richard Nixon (May 19, 1977), reprinted in N.Y. TIMES,
May 20, 1977, at A16. This remarkable deviation does not undermine the principle, given
that the statement typically evokes incredulity and its source was a President forced to
resign in disgrace for unlawful acts.
95. GUIDELINES, supra note 16, app. 2 at 1604.
96. Id.
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advice were given with a wink and a nod so that the President was not
actually misled, OLC would be wrongfully empowering the President to
violate his constitutional obligations.
As discussed further in the next Subpart, the Take Care Clause does
not preclude Presidents from promoting their sincerely held legal views
through appropriate means. Presidents also retain authority to reject
OLC's advice and act instead upon their own understandings of the
law, but only if they are acting based upon good faith, best legal inter-
pretations. Presidents in practice rarely have acted contrary to the
advice of OLC or the attorney general. History, though, provides a few
instructive examples, beginning with George Washington's thoughtful
consideration of the constitutionality of federal legislation to establish
a national bank. Washington requested and received legal opinions from
his cabinet, and ultimately agreed with his secretary of treasury Alexander
Hamilton that the bank was legal, rather than with his attorney general
who concluded to the contrary.97 Franklin Roosevelt famously disagreed
with his attorney general Robert Jackson about the constitutionality of
a legislative veto provision in the Lend Lease Act and Jackson then
memorialized Roosevelt's constitutional views, with which the Supreme
Court ultimately agreed, in a memorandum later published in the Harvard
Law Review.9"
Because the President makes the final call and bears ultimate responsi-
bility for legal determinations as well as policy choices, OLC's advice
should fully inform the President, as well as other readers, and address
strong arguments counter to its conclusions. If the President or attorney
general ever asks OLC to provide advice outside of OLC's typical inter-
pretive stance and authoritative role, as when Jackson memorialized
Roosevelt's views on the legislative veto, OLC should be sure it expressly
and accurately describes the nature of such advice to ensure that it is
not misinterpreted as OLC's best view of the law. Moreover, although
OLC serves a role more akin to that of a judge than an advocate-and
sometimes literally does resolve intrabranch disputes between parties on
conflicting ends of a legal question--OLC's role is more complicated than
that of a disinterested arbiter. OLC's charge is to help the President
achieve desired policies in conformity with the law and that often involves
97. A leading constitutional law casebook begins very effectively by detailing how
Washington and others wrestled with the constitutionality of a national bank. See PAUL BREST
ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING (2006).
98. See Robert H. Jackson, A Presidential Legal Opinion, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1353 (1953).
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actively devising alternatives to a legally flawed proposal. To faithfully
execute the laws OLC lawyers, though, never properly inform the exercise
of the President's obligation by misrepresenting what the law requires."
That the President should premise his actions on the administration's
best-and not merely plausible-interpretations of the relevant law is a
relatively uncontroversial principle, at least as a theoretical matter.
Senators questioned Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, Deputy Attorney
General Timothy Flanigan, and Acting Assistant Attorney General for
OLC Steven Bradbury during their confirmation hearings about their
views on the Guidelines, and they all indicated their general agreement.100
In the weeks before President Clinton assumed office, I personally con-
ducted numerous interviews as part of the executive branch transition effort
with former and current OLC lawyers, congressional staffers and others
who had worked with OLC. Virtually all, regardless of party or institutional
affiliation, described the primary function of OLC as ensuring the legality
of executive action, and they ranked the ability to say no to the President
99. Former Assistant Attorney General Randolph Moss, who served in OLC under
President Clinton, put it well:
[I]f the Constitution and relevant statutes are best construed to preclude a proposed
policy or action, it is largely irrelevant whether a reasonable argument might be made
in favor of the legality of the proposal .... A reasonable argument might diminish
the political costs of the contemplated action and it might avoid embarrassment
in the courts, but it cannot provide the authority to act. Only the best view of the
law can do that.
Moss, supra note 86, at 1316. The determination that Presidents should act upon the "best" view
of the law, though, leaves open what is meant by the "best" interpretation-notably, to what
extent the executive appropriately may act upon legal interpretations that differ from
those of the Supreme Court. The question of executive interpretive independence is the
subject of some dispute and is discussed in the next Subpart.
100. See, e.g., Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Alberto R. Gonzales to Be Attorney
General of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 229
(2005) (written responses of Alberto Gonzalez to questions from Senator Russell D. Feingold)
("I completely agree that it is, and has always been, the duty and function of the Office of
Legal Counsel to provide the President and the Executive Branch with an accurate and
honest analysis of the law, even if that analysis would constrain the pursuit of policy goals.
If confirmed as Attorney General, I would work with the Assistant Attorney General for
the Office of Legal Counsel to ensure that OLC continues to employ the practices necessary
to meet the highest standards of legal analysis."); Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of
Timothy Elliott Flanigan to Be Deputy Attorney General: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 120 (2005) (written responses of Timothy Flanigan to questions from
Senator Edward M. Kennedy) ("I have reviewed generally the [Guidelines] and agree with much
of the document. I believe that the document reflects operating principles that have long
guided OLC in both Republican and Democratic administrations."); Confirmation Hearings on
Federal Appointments: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 766 (2005)
(written responses of Steven Bradbury to questions from Senator Patrick Leahy) ("The
[Guidelines] generally reflect operating principles that have long guided OLC in both
Republican and Democratic administrations.").
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as an essential qualification for the job of heading OLC.'°' Even John Yoo,
widely believed to be the principal drafter of the Torture Opinion, ' pur-
ports to believe that the government's policy goals should not bias
OLC's legal advice.' 3
Measured by this standard, the Torture Opinion utterly fails. In what
unmistakably is an advocacy piece, OLC abandoned fundamental practices
of principled and balanced legal interpretation. The Torture Opinion
relentlessly seeks to circumvent all legal limits on the CIA's ability to
engage in torture, and it simply ignores arguments to the contrary. The
Opinion fails, for example, to cite highly relevant precedent, regulations,
101. John McGinnis's writings suggest some of the most thoughtful alternatives to this view.
He has described three interpretive models for OLC: "court-centered" and "independent
authority," both of which can be viewed as variations on the "best, accurate" stance but that
allow for different degrees of executive interpretive independence, and "situational," which
"would not be concerned with expounding a consistent and principled jurisprudence ... but
with using any plausible principles to achieve the policy goal desired by his client." John 0.
McGinnis, Models of the Opinion Function of the Attorney General: A Normative, Descriptive,
and Historical Prolegomenon, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 375, 377, 403 (1993). McGinnis described
all three models as "plausible." Id. at 377. Elsewhere, McGinnis considered the value of any
search for fixed constitutional meaning with specific regard to decisions about whether
the use of military force requires congressional authorization. He argued that, in this
context, the President and Congress are best restrained not by "rule centrism"-which
involves a search for a fixed and determinate meaning of the War Powers Clause-but by "a
form of spontaneous order-the result of accommodations and implicit bargaining between
the branches." John 0. McGinnis, The Spontaneous Order of War Powers, 47 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 1317, 1317-18 (1997).
102. See, e.g., Michael Hirsh et al., A Tortured Debate, NEWSWEEK, June 21, 2004, at 50
(reporting that the Torture Opinion was drafted by John Yoo); Al Kamen, Taking Terrorism
Law on the Road, WASH. POST, Feb. 24, 2006, at A13 (describing Yoo as the "author of the
famous Torture Memo").
103. In a July 19, 2005 interview with the PBS documentary series Frontline, Yoo
described his view of OLC's role in the context of discussing the Torture Opinion:
I think the role is, what does the law say that applies to interrogation of enemy
aliens with whom we're at war? And the primary statute is the [1994] torture statute.
And the question is, what does a statute mean?
At the Justice Department, I think it's very important not to put in an opinion
interpreting a law on what you think the right thing to do is, because I think you
don't want to bias the legal advice with these other considerations. Otherwise, I
think people will question the validity of the legal advice. They'll say, "Well, the
reason they reached that result is that they had certain moral views or certain
policy goals they wanted to achieve."
And actually I think at the Justice Department and this office, there's a long
tradition of keeping the law and policy separate. The department is there to
interpret the law so that people who make policy know the rules of the game, but
you're not telling them what plays to call, essentially.
Frontline, The Torture Question (PBS television broadcast July 19, 2005), available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/torture/interviews/yoo.html.
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and even constitutional provisions, and it misuses sources upon which
it does rely.1 4 Anthony Lewis captured well, and colorfully, the problem
with how OLC seemed to perceive its role: "The memo reads like the
advice of a mob lawyer to a mafia don on how to skirt the law and stay out
of prison. Avoiding prosecution is literally a theme of the memorandum.',1
5
Yoo remains almost alone in continuing to assert that the Torture
Opinion was "entirely accurate" and not outcome driven, 10 6 notwithstand-
ing the Bush Administration's extraordinary repudiation of the Opinion.
Other administration officials have acknowledged that the administration's
approach to legal questions regarding terrorism has been "forward-leaning":
"Legally, the watchword became 'forward-leaning,"' said a former associate
White House counsel, Bradford Berenson, "by which everybody meant:
'We want to be aggressive. We want to take risks.""' 7
One way to test Yoo's claim is to consider whether OLC would have
written the opinion in the same manner if the President had preferred to
receive an OLC opinion that concluded the federal anti-torture statute
actually did tie his hands. What if the question had come, for example,
from an administration that was truly committed to treating all detainees
lawfully and humanely but was under pressure from members of Congress
104. For example, in support of its definition of torture, the opinion relies on statutes
that define emergency medical condition for the purpose of providing health benefits-
which the opinion acknowledges is "a substantially different subject"-but it ignores relevant
federal cases and regulations that actually address the meaning of torture. For more detailed
criticisms of the Torture Opinion's reasoning, see sources cited supra note 24.
105. Anthony Lewis, Making Torture Legal, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, July 15, 2004, at 4.
106. JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON
TERROR 169 (2006). Yoo argues that the initial Torture Opinion was superior to its replace-
ment, which he describes as "a disservice to the personnel, especially those in the field, who
had to rely on the Justice Department's advice to take risks in fighting the war on terrorism."
Id. at 171. "The second opinion not only retracted the bright lines the 2002 memo attempted
to draw, replacing them with vague language that gave less offense, it provided much less
guidance or clarity." Id. Adrian Vermeule and Eric Posner are among the handful of
scholars who defended the Opinion, but they defended it not on the merits, but rather on
the grounds that "the memorandum's arguments are standard lawyerly fare, routine stuff"
from an office "whose jurisprudence has traditionally been highly pro-executive." Adrian
Vermeule & Eric A. Posner, A 'Torture' Memo and Its Tortuous Critics, WALL ST. J., July 6,
2004, at A22. Regarding the merits, they write that the Opinion's conclusion "may be
right or wrong-and we, too, would have preferred more analysis of this point-but it falls
within the bounds of professionally respectable argument." Id. They thus apparently disagree
with the Guidelines' first principle.
107. Tim Golden, After Terror, A Secret Rewriting of Military Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
24, 2004; see also Deborah Sontag, Terror Suspect's Path From Streets to Brig, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 25, 2004 ("'The president's response from 9/11 forward was to use every power and
means at his disposal to try to prevent another attack,' said Brad Berenson, a former associate
White House counsel.").
who believed the President was not tough enough-who insisted that
having the legal authority to cross the line into torture when questioning
suspected al Qaeda leaders was in the United States' national security
interests? It is inconceivable that, in those counterfactual circumstances,
OLC would have written the opinion as it did, interpreting the meaning
of "torture" so narrowly or crafting the implausible defenses of necessity
and self-defense. Even if written by the same lawyers-lawyers committed
to an aggressively expansive theory of presidential authority-and even
if it had reached the same ultimate conclusion, the reasoning and the
issues addressed undoubtedly would have differed substantially.
The Torture Opinion's section on the President's commander-in-chief
authority is similarly flawed, but it raises an additional set of questions
relevant to the general OLC standards. The Opinion claims that Congress
lacks the authority to enact legislation prohibiting the government
from torturing those the President designates as "enemy combatants" in
the "War on Terror": "Congress can no more interfere with the President's
conduct of the interrogation of enemy combatants than it can dictate
strategic or tactical decisions on the battlefield."'"0 Like the rest of the
Opinion, this section is misleading and poorly reasoned. It omits discussion
of constitutional text and Supreme Court precedent inconsistent with its
extreme view of the commander-in-chief power. It purports to assess
the constitutionality of the federal anti-torture statute "[iun light of the
President's complete authority over the conduct of war"; yet it fails even
to mention that the Constitution expressly confers considerable war powers
on Congress, including the power to make rules concerning captures on
land and water" and to make rules for the government and regulation of
the land and naval forces." ° The Opinion also fails to cite and apply the
watershed Supreme Court opinion most relevant to assessing the consti-
tutionality of the statute: Justice Jackson's three-part framework set forth
in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer."' As written, this section of
the Opinion, like the other sections, only makes sense as an advocacy
piece, tailored to an administration that, as Yoo described it, "wanted the
maximum flexibility for the president to win the war," including the flexi-
bility to act counter to statutory constraints.1
2
108. Torture Opinion, supra note 6, at 39.
109. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 11.
110. Id. at cl. 14.
111. 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
112. Yoo, supra note 106, at 2.
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Notwithstanding these flaws, Yoo seems sincere in his belief in the
accuracy of the Opinion's conclusions with regard to the scope of the
President's commander-in-chief power. Of far greater significance, the Bush
Administration continues to espouse an extreme view of extensive presi-
dential war powers beyond Congress's legislative reach. Although the
Replacement Opinion dropped as "unnecessary""' any discussion of the scope
of the commander-in-chief power, President Bush has asserted the author-
ity to ignore other statutory requirements that conflict with his
constitutional views."' In such circumstances, admonishing OLC
lawyers-and ultimately the President-to adhere to "accurate" views
of the law does not resolve the matter.
Presidential lawyers thus must confront whether and how they may
legitimately promote and act upon legal views that they sincerely hold but
that are not shared by the Court, Congress, or the mainstream of legal
thought. The Bush Administration's highly controversial, and at times
flawed and misleading, claims of authority to disregard statutes has
prompted an understandable but, in part, misguided backlash against presi-
dential interpretive authority, and presidential signing statements in
particular. The Torture Opinion and other abuses warrant close scrutiny
of the Bush Administration's positions both on specific issues and also on
the general standards that govern its legal interpretations. Critics, though,
should take care not to condemn legitimate methods of presidential legal
interpretation when the true problem lies with the specific substance of
the Bush Administration's flawed legal reasoning. The nature and extent
of the President's authority to rely upon distinctive legal views is a surpris-
ingly complicated question of tremendous consequence, and the subject of
the next Subpart.
B. Distinctive Attributes of Presidential Legal Interpretation
The Guidelines touch briefly on the complexities that distinguish OLC
interpretation from judicial interpretation, complexities that both allow
for a measure of distinctive presidential interpretive authority and also
impose special obligations on executive legal interpretation. As the
Guidelines state, at times "OLC's legal analyses ... should reflect the institu-
tional traditions and competencies of the executive branch as well as the
113. Replacement Opinion, supra note 55, at 2.
114. See sources cited supra notes 5, 7.
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views of the President who currently holds office."" 5 At other times OLC
"appropriately identifies legal limits on executive branch action that a
court would not require" because "jurisdictional and prudential limitations
do not constrain OLC as they do courts."'"6
OLC's scrutiny of proposed executive action sometimes should be
more searching than that of the courts because courts sometimes do not
fully examine the legality of executive action."7 This appropriately defer-
ential review is a central reason OLC's role is so critical. Courts employ a
variety of jurisdictional and prudential limitations that either preclude
review-such as standing and the political question doctrine-or that result
in only partial review." 8 Prominent examples include courts' reluctance to
intervene in negotiations between the President and Congress over issues of
executive privilege and the use of military force. Under the Chevron
doctrine, courts afford substantial deference to executive agencies' inter-
pretations of the statutes they are charged with implementing."9 The
rational basis review standard that the courts routinely apply in reviewing
the constitutionality of federal statutes, absent cause for more searching
scrutiny, entails substantial interbranch deference. Congress occasionally
will further limit the jurisdiction of courts to review political branch action,
as it did in the DTA and the MCA.'
In circumstances in which executive action, if undertaken, would
likely encounter limited or no judicial review-as in the treatment of
Guantanamo detainees, given the MCA's limitations on jurisdiction-
OLC's review should not be subject to the same limitations. In considering
whether a proposed action is lawful, the proper OLC inquiry is not simply
whether the executive branch can get away with it, in the sense of
avoiding judicial condemnation. To the contrary, as the Guidelines state,
the President and OLC then have "a special obligation to ensure compli-
ance with the law, including respect for the rights of affected individuals
and the constitutional allocation of powers."''2' Without the possibility
of judicial review and in the face of overwhelming secrecy, the legal
rights of detainees the U.S. holds outside of U.S. territory-including their
freedom from physical harm during interrogations-depend overwhelmingly
115. GUIDELINES, supra note 16, app. 2 at 1606.
116. Id.
117. See Pillard, supra note 86, at 687-98.
118. Id.
119. Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
120. See Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739 (2005); Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat.
2600 (2006).
121. GUIDELINES, supra note 16, app. 2 at 1605.
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on the President's good faith efforts to ensure that all government actors
adhere to legal constraints. The Bush Administration's record and its
celebration of the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the MCA raise
grounds for tremendous concern about whether and how the admini-
stration will enforce the MCA. No serious question exists, though,
about the President's constitutional obligation to comply with the MCA's
detainee protections-or about OLC's obligation to facilitate that
compliance through its legal advice.
In some contexts, however, OLC's legal analysis may appropriately
favor desired executive action precisely because executive branch entities
possess relevant expertise or because the President holds views on the legal
issue presented. The Guidelines refer briefly to the executive branch's
authority to promote and act upon its own legal views, stating that OLC's
legal interpretations may reflect, where appropriate, "the institutional
traditions and competencies of the executive branch as well as the views of
the President who currently holds office."''1 In some instances, this presents
no direct conflict with the other branches' legal views and expectations.
To take one example, the courts routinely afford the executive branch
Chevron deference in appropriate circumstances, and Congress is well aware
of that practice and may account for it in fashioning legislation. In
reviewing the legality of proposed regulations to which courts would give
Chevron deference, OLC should not ask simply whether the regulations
would withstand judicial review-that is, whether they are arbitrary,
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.12 3 Mirroring the judicial
standard for deference would inadequately ensure that the regulation
complied with the statute-if, for example, the agency were simply
trying to take advantage of the deferential review it knew a court would
give. OLC should, however, defer to actual agency expertise and political
122. Id. at 1606. Extensive academic writings address the issue of extrajudicial constitutional
interpretation, and in recent years growing numbers of scholars have extolled the virtues
of political branch interpretive independence and involvement in the development of
constitutional understandings. See, e.g., Johnsen, supra note 86, at 108 n.15, 110-112 & nn.18-
33, 114 n.36 (discussing participants in this debate over extrajudicial constitutionalism);
Pillard, supra note 86, at 678-679 & nn.3-10 (same). Nina Pillard persuasively cautioned
that, although the promise of extrajudicial constitutionalism is theoretically attractive, the
literature to date inadequately considers the political branches' actual practices. Pillard's analysis
helped fill that gap and led her to conclude that, especially with regard to the protection of
individual rights, the executive branch "has failed fully to meet the challenges of interpreting
and applying the Constitution on its own." Pillard, supra note 86, at 677. In the same spirit as
the Guidelines and this Article's elaboration on the Guidelines, Pillard followed her critique with
suggestions for reform to foster principled executive branch legal interpretation. Id. at 743-58.
123. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
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choices among permissible alternatives. Judicial doctrine here (and
elsewhere) contemplates a distinctive executive branch interpretive role.'24
Further, OLC typically and appropriately considers not only judicial
precedent, but also executive branch tradition and precedent in the form
of attorney general and OLC opinions. Such sources play a special role with
regard to separation of powers issues where judicial doctrine is relatively
scarce but executive branch sources tend to be extensive. 125
A far more suspect and complicated circumstance is presented by
executive branch proposals that are premised on a legal view that flatly
conflicts with the views of the Supreme Court or Congress. Presidents at
times do disagree with prevailing judicial precedent or congressional
sentiment, based on the advice of lawyers or their own legal under-
standings, and their alternative view may be principled and not merely
policy driven. History provides many interesting examples of Presidents
who openly engaged in principled constitutional interpretation or other-
wise sought to promote legal change. Prominent examples include Thomas
Jefferson on the constitutionality of the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798,
Abraham Lincoln on Dred Scott v. Sandford,2 ' Franklin Roosevelt on
congressional authority to address the Great Depression, and Ronald
Reagan on many pressing issues of the day, from abortion to criminal
procedure to congressional power.'27 When Presidents believe that the
judiciary has made a "bad" decision, they can provide a valuable public
voice for the contrary view. I have argued elsewhere that the legitimacy
of presidential actions premised upon distinctive legal views depends on
the context, and that chief among the relevant factors are the particular
presidential power being exercised and the interpretive processes
followed. In formulating legal views, Presidents and their advisors should
124. The appropriate approach to providing legal advice within the executive branch
regarding an agency regulation that might warrant Chevron deference if reviewed by a court thus
depends on a variety of factors including the vagueness of the statute, the extent to which
Congress delegated authority to the relevant agency to fill legislative gaps, the agency's expertise,
and the administration's policy agenda.
125. See H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE ATORNEYS GENERAL
(1999); H. Jefferson Powell, The President's Authority Over Foreign Affairs: An Executive Branch
Perspective, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 527 (1999).
126. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
127. For discussion of these and other examples, with citations, see Dawn E. Johnsen,
Presidential Non-Enforcement of Constitutionally Objectionable Statutes, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Winter/Spring 2000, at 7, 19-21 [hereinafter Johnsen, Presidential Non-Enforcement]; Dawn
E. Johnsen, Ronald Reagan and the Rehnquist Court on Congressional Power: Presidential
Influences on Constitutional Change, 78 IND. L.J. 363, 370-77, 383-99 (2003) [hereinafter
Johnsen, Reagan and the Rehnquist Court].
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always exercise principled deliberation, humility, and, as the Guidelines
state, "due respect for the constitutional views of the courts and Congress.'
21
That Presidents in at least some circumstances possess the authority
to promote a distinctive legal view is beyond serious question and helps
explain many significant constitutional changes throughout U.S. history
(some of them unquestionably for the better). Most clear, Presidents may
act on their own constitutional views, even counter to the Court's inter-
pretations, when exercising authority that the Constitution assigns
exclusively to them without limitation as to the reasons for the exercise
of the authority. Presidents clearly may exercise the veto or pardon powers
based on policy preferences, which may include the desire to promote a
preferred constitutional view. Also beyond dispute, Presidents may publicly
discuss their legal views, including their disagreement with the Court or
Congress, and urge either of those bodies to change their views through
litigation or legislation. Reagan's Department of Justice took this to an
extreme by developing a detailed blueprint for radically changing constitu-
tional law on a host of issues. 9 And, as numerous Presidents have, they may
appoint federal judges likely to implement their view of the law. Those who
disagree with a President's substantive views of course remain free to oppose
such efforts-in Congress, in courts, in public debate, and at the polls. 3
128. GUIDELINES, supra note 16, app. 2 at 1606; see Johnsen, supra note 86, at 120-34.
Former Acting Solicitor General and Assistant Attorney General for OLC Walter Dellinger
has also written of the need for OLC lawyers to express not merely their own constitutional
views but "to work within a tradition of reasoned, executive branch precedent, memorial-
ized in formal written opinions." Walter Dellinger, After the Cold War: Presidential Power
and the Use of Military Force, 50 U. MIAMI. L. REV. 107 (1995).
129. See Johnsen, Reagan and the Rehnquist Court, supra note 127, at 383-99.
130. The President and the attorney general may call upon OLC for assistance in any of these
contexts. This Article discusses OLC's core function of providing accurate legal advice to inform contem-
plated presidential or other executive branch action. As the Guidelines note, OLC's work may also
involve other finctions and the appropriate interpretive stance might vary accordingly. See GUIDELINES,
supra note 16, app. 2 at 1610 ("OLC sometimes provides legal advice that is not intended to inform the
formulation of executive branch policy or action, and in some such circumstances an advocacy model
may be appropriate."). To take one common example, OLC at times assists the solicitor general and
other Department of Justice litigating divisions in developing the government's litigating position. When
defending acts of Congress, the Department of Justice typically offers courts all reasonable arguments in
their defense--even arguments that do not represent the best view of the law. Courts expect the
government to take this stance. See Seth P. Waxman, Defending Congress, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1073 (2001).
OLC's advice in this context is not binding on others in the executive branch and may reflect the
Department's traditional role as an advocate for the constitutionality of federal legislation. Whatever
function it serves, OLC should always articulate precisely the nature of its advice: "OLC should be clear
whenever it intends its advice to fall outside of OLC's typical role as the source of legal
determinations that are binding within the executive branch." GUIDELINES, supra note 16, app. 2 at
1610. "Client agencies expect OLC to provide its best view of applicable legal constraints and if OLC
acts otherwise without adequate warning, it risks prompting unlawful executive branch action." Id.
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The Bush Administration's claims go well beyond these widely
accepted forms of advocacy and threaten to tarnish the legitimacy of
valuable and appropriate presidential interpretive practices. For example,
President Bush has come under severe and warranted attack for frequently
refraining from vetoing bills he views as constitutionally objectionable
and instead issuing signing statements in which he raises constitutional
objections to legislative provisions while signing them into law. In response,
the American Bar Association has issued a sweeping condemnation of not
only President Bush's use of signing statements, but also their use by past
Presidents.' Signing statements that announce the President's legal views
or intent regarding implementation of a law, however, provide the public
with valuable information, which is especially rare and needed from the
highly secretive Bush Administration. Critics should take care not to deter
the appropriate use of signing statements as a form of presidential communica-
tion and should instead focus on evaluating the legal views expressed in the
statements and any inappropriate executive action premised on those views."'
Bush's claims of authority to act on his own legal views have been
particularly controversial and deservedly condemned because he often
has made them in the context traditionally viewed as the most suspect
and least often justified: the refusal to enforce a statute. In addition to
asserting what I will refer to as nonenforcement authority, Bush often
has stated that the manner in which he interprets and enforces a statutory
provision will be affected by what he views as his office's constitutional
authority, consistent with the judicial canon of constitutional avoidance.'33
131. AM. BAR ASS'N, TASK FORCE ON PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS AND THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE (2006), http://www.abanet.org/op/signingstatements/
abajfinal-signing-statementsrecommendation-report_7-24-06.pdf.
132. See Posting of David Barron, Dawn Johnsen et al. to Georgetown Law Faculty
Blog, Untangling the Debate on Presidential Signing Statements, (July 31, 2006),
http://gulcfac.typepad.com/georgetown-university_law/2006/07/thanks to-the-p.html.
133. In its classic statement of the avoidance canon, the Supreme Court wrote that "where
an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the
Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such a construction is plainly
contrary to the intent of Congress." Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988). Trevor Morrison and H. Jefferson Powell both
have raised questions of great practical importance and theoretical interest about whether
the executive branch should continue in this way to aggrandize executive power through
what at least at times constitutes a misuse of the judicial canon of constitutional avoid-
ance. See Morrison, supra note 7; Powell, supra note 7. Morrison does not reach a definitive
conclusion, but he thoroughly discusses the relevant considerations and he details the Bush
Administration's abuses of the canon. See generally Morrison, supra note 7. Powell concludes
that, due to the demonstrated high risk of abuse, the executive branch should never use the
avoidance canon "when the issue involves the Commander-in-Chief power or other questions about
the separation of powers between Congress and the President." Powell, supra note 7, at 1315.
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The Torture Opinion made both of these forms of claims of authority. If
Bush or his lawyers instead had given a speech or testified before Congress
urging amendment of the statutory prohibition on torture on the grounds
that it unconstitutionally constrains the President as commander-in-
chief-or if Bush had vetoed a bill on such grounds-Bush would have
acted well within his authority. Objections would have appropriately
focused on the merits of his constitutional argument. The Torture Opinion
and many of Bush's signing statements raise the additional problem of
the difficult question of the extent of the President's nonenforcement
authority when confronted with a statutory provision that the President
believes is unconstitutional.
Bush's abuses notwithstanding, in relatively rare circumstances,
Presidents do have the authority to refuse to comply with statutes.
134
Congress occasionally enacts laws that contain unconstitutional provisions.
Presidents and their lawyers at OLC therefore must consider the nature of
presidential authority-and responsibility-when confronted with a statu-
tory provision that they believe is unconstitutional. Presidents long have
asserted the authority, at least in very narrow circumstances, to decline to
enforce unconstitutional laws. The easiest cases for nonenforcement
authority involve statutory provisions that are clearly unconstitutional
under applicable Supreme Court precedent. For example, despite the
Court's ruling in INS v. Chadha3s to the contrary, Congress persists in
enacting clearly unconstitutional provisions as parts of multiprovision
134. I have written previously in greater detail on the President's authority and respon-
sibility with regard to unconstitutional statutes. See Johnsen, Presidential Non-Enforcement,
supra note 127. For other views, see, for example, David Barron, Constitutionalism in the Shadow
of Doctrine: The President's Non-Enforcement Power, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring
2000, at 61; Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905 (1990);
Christopher N. May, Presidential Defiance of "Unconstitutional" Laws: Reviving the Royal
Prerogative, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 865 (1994); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most
Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994).
135. 462 U.S. 919 (1983). The Chadha Court acknowledged the presidential practice
of signing multiprovision legislation despite the presence of constitutionally objectionable
provisions. Id. at 942 n.13. The Court cited as an example President Franklin Roosevelt's
decision to sign the Lend-Lease Act of 1941, due to the exigencies of World War II, despite
the law's inclusion of an unconstitutional provision. Id. Well in advance of the Court's Chadha
decision, Roosevelt concluded that a provision allowing Congress to terminate the law's
authorization by concurrent resolution was unconstitutional. See id. ("[I]t is not uncommon
for Presidents to approve legislation containing parts which are objectionable on constitu-
tional grounds. For example, after President Roosevelt signed the Lend-Lease Act of 1941,
Attorney General Jackson released a memorandum explaining the President's view that the
provision allowing the Act's authorization to be terminated by concurrent resolution was
unconstitutional."); see also Robert H. Jackson, A Presidential Legal Opinion, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1353
(1953) (the attorney general memorandum memorializing Roosevelt's constitutional concerns).
legislation that require the executive branch to obtain approval from a
single house of Congress or congressional committee before taking particu-
lar actions. Consistent with Chadha, Presidents view such provisions as
unconstitutional and do not comply with them; they typically treat the
provisions as instead requiring mere reporting to the designated entity."'
Presidential nonenforcement is far more problematic, and far less often
justified, when the Court has not provided clear direction and the
constitutional issue is susceptible to reasonable dispute. In perhaps the
most well-known and compelling such example, President Jefferson
refused to prosecute anyone under the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798-
and pardoned those previously convicted-because he viewed the statute as
unconstitutional.17  His judgment that the law violated the First
Amendment was hotly coneested at the time and the Supreme Court
did not expressly resolve the dispute (ultimately in Jefferson's favor) until
163 years later. 3 ' As this example reveals, presidential nonenforce-
ment of a statute at times might entail protecting the constitutional rights
of individuals. More often, though, nonenforcement arises in the context
of a law that infringes on presidential authority-or more precisely, what a
sitting President views as presidential authority. President Bush's constitu-
tional objections overwhelmingly have involved expansive claims of
presidential power.
The Guidelines do not take a position on the legitimacy or the scope
of presidential nonenforcement authority and describe that issue as
beyond the scope of the statement. The Guidelines simply acknowledge the
136. See NEIL KINKOPF, SIGNING STATEMENTS AND THE PRESIDENT'S AUTHORITY
TO REFUSE TO ENFORCE THE LAW 3-4, available at http://www.acslaw.org/files/Kinkopf-
Signing%20Statements-Jun%202006-Advance%2OVol%201.pdf (last visited July 21, 2007)
(noting that "Congress has enacted hundreds of legislative vetoes since Chadha, and not even
members of Congress expect the President to veto such legislation or to enforce the patently
unconstitutional legislative veto provisions").
137. Jefferson wrote to Abigail Adams of his decision to act on his own constitutional views,
which were counter to several lower federal courts:
[N]othing in the Constitution has given [judges] ... a right to decide for the Executive,
more than to the Executive to decide for them .... The judges, believing the law
constitutional, had a right to pass sentence of fine and imprisonment; because that
power was placed in their hands by the Constitution. But the Executive, believing the
law to be unconstitutional, was bound to remit the execution of it; because that power
has been confided to him by the Constitution.
8 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 311 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., G.P. Putnam's Sons 1897)
(1905). Jefferson's refusal to enforce the statute occurred in a context in which the case in
favor of nonenforcement authority is particularly strong because Presidents typically enjoy
broad prosecutorial discretion.
138. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964).
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traditionally very "rare" practice and address the "bare minimum" process
the President should follow." 9 This Article, too, will turn now to the
processes that should guide nonenforcement decisions and OLC advice-
giving more generally. To conclude with a few final observations:
Historically Presidents rarely have declined to enforce constitutionally
objectionable statutes. Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti put it
well in observing that when the President is confronted with a constitu-
tionally objectionable statute, "it is almost always the case that he can
best discharge the responsibilities of his office by defending and
enforcing the Act of Congress." 4' Factors that traditionally have sup-
ported nonenforcement include a constitutional defect that was clear
(either on its face or under judicial precedent), an encroachment upon
presidential power, or a constitutional violation unlikely to be justiciable
absent nonenforcement.' I have argued elsewhere that this practice of
typically enforcing statutes that Presidents find constitutionally dubious
properly reflects respect for the constitutional views of Congress and the
courts and for the legislative process: The veto and points earlier in the
legislative process are when the President ordinarily should act on
constitutional concerns.
41
Because of intense secrecy, whether and to what extent Bush actually
has refused to comply with statutory provisions remains unknown. He
has, however, asserted the right to refuse to enforce statutes far more
frequently than any previous President.1 3  His vague and abbreviated
139. GUIDELINES, supra note 16, app. 2 at 1607.
140. The Attorney General's Duty to Defend and Enforce Constitutionally Objectionable
Legislation, 4A Op. Off. Legal Counsel 55 (1980) (memorandum from Attorney General
Benjamin R. Civiletti) [hereinafter 1980 Civiletti Memorandum].
141. See Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, 18 Op.
Off. Legal Counsel 199 (1994) (memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Walter
Dellinger); 1980 Civiletti Memorandum, supra note 140. Under Presidents Ronald Reagan
and George H. W. Bush, though, OLC at times has described presidential nonenforcement
authority in far more sweeping terms. See Issues Raised by Provisions Directing Issuance of
Official or Diplomatic Passports, 16 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 18 (1992) (memorandum from
Acting Assistant Attorney General Timothy E. Flanigan); Issues Raised by Foreign Relations
Authorization Bill, 14 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 37 (1990) (memorandum from Assistant Attorney
General William P. Barr); see also Johnsen, Presidential Non-Enforcement, supra note 127, at 44-52
(discussing prior executive branch practice and policy).
142. See Johnsen, Presidential Non-Enforcement, supra note 127 (evaluating the appropriate
standards for nonenforcement and their application to President Clinton's decision to enforce,
but to refuse to defend, a statute that required him to fire anyone in the military who tested
HIV-positive).
143. See HALSTEAD, supra note 7; Cooper, supra note 7; Savage, supra note 7. But see Curtis
A. Bradley & Eric A. Posner, Presidential Signing Statements and Executive Power, 23 CONST.
COMMENTARY 307, 311 (2006) ("For the most part, the claims made in President Bush's signing
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explanations typically do not adequately inform Congress or the pub-
lic about the precise nature of the alleged constitutional defect.
Notwithstanding the extraordinary frequency of the assertions, the Bush
Administration has never described the standards it follows in making
nonenforcement decisions. The Torture Opinion, in particular, does not
even acknowledge the profound challenges to the rule of law raised by
presidential nonenforcement of statutes, let alone apply any limiting
principles to the exercise of this authority. ' Thus, what is known about
the Bush Administration's approach to nonenforcement puts it far out
of the mainstreams of presidential practice and legal thought.45
C. OLC's Interpretive Processes: Safeguards for the Rule of Law
As the Guidelines' first principle instructs, the paramount principle
that should guide OLC's work is the imperative to provide accurate and
honest legal appraisals, unbiased by policymakers' preferred outcomes.
Several of the Guidelines' remaining principles recommend internal
executive branch processes to help achieve this ideal. The detailed nature
of these recommendations-which cover everything from the form that
requests for advice should take 46 to how many OLC deputy assistant
attorneys general should sign off on advice before it is finalized' 47-reflects
the authors' strong conviction that regularized internal processes and
mechanisms are critical to maintaining commitment to the first principle
in the face of inevitable pressures to the contrary.
48
statements ... are similar to the claims made by other recent presidents, such as President
Clinton. In addition, there are other plausible explanations for the Bush administration's high
number of challenges.").
144. Torture Opinion, supra note 6.
145. Commentators who advocate for a much broader scope of presidential nonenforce-
ment authority typically argue that the Constitution is paramount among the laws the
President must "take Care" to faithfully execute, and the President therefore must enforce
the Constitution over an unconstitutional statute. As I have stated elsewhere, this formulation
of the issue "begs a critical question: 'unconstitutional' in whose view?... When the executive
and legislative branches disagree, and the judicial branch has not spoken, which branch's view
of the Constitution should prevail?" Johnsen, Presidential Non-Enforcement, supra note 127, at 17.
146. "Whenever possible, agency requests should be in writing, should include the request-
ing agency's own best legal views as well as any relevant materials and information, and
should be as specific as circumstances allow." GUIDELINES, supra note 16, app. 2 at 1608.
147. "Ordinarily OLC legal advice should be subject to multiple layers of scrutiny and
approval; one such mechanism used effectively at times is a 'two deputy rule' that requires at
least two supervising deputies to review and clear all OLC advice." Id. at 1609.
148. "OLC should maintain internal systems and practices to help ensure that OLC's
legal advice is of the highest possible quality and represents the best possible view of the
law." Id. at1608.
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The notion that when assessing a proposed action OLC should engage
not in advocacy but in objective and accurate legal interpretation will
not be intuitive to all observers (or to all new OLC attorneys) and therefore
must be deliberately reinforced. Our law schools and legal culture teach
that courts-not elected officials-are the appropriate neutral expositors
of law. Indeed, many executive branch lawyers serving in other functions
appropriately do act as legal advocates for the government, including in
court and in front of OLC.'49 Additionally, cynicism pervades public
attitudes about the ability of political actors to interpret the law in a
principled fashion, and the Torture Opinion and other legal positions
taken by the Bush Administration in the War on Terror certainly have
reinforced and deepened that cynicism. Lawyers now may come to the
executive branch with a distorted view of OLC, knowing only that
OLC issued the infamous Torture Opinion and sanctioned the Bush
Administration's other highly controversial national security policies.
OLC therefore greatly benefits its new attorneys, as well as OLC
clients throughout the executive branch, when it clearly articulates the
principles that guide its work. OLC should expressly instruct its attorneys
from the outset of their service regarding the proper stance from which
to provide advice whenever fulfilling the office's core function of
guiding executive action. OLC also should make those standards avail-
able to the public, to inform Congress and the courts as they evaluate
executive branch positions and to alert the press and the public as they
seek accountability. OLC's failures during the Bush Administration
and the resulting damage to OLC's reputation have created a compel-
ling need for clarification of the standards that actually govern OLC's
work. 5' The Bush OLC's excessive secrecy has compounded the dam-
age to its reputation: Because OLC has released shockingly few of its
legal opinions, observers cannot assess the extent to which it adheres to
best practices. The Guidelines provide a strong starting point, for they
reflect what nineteen former OLC attorneys viewed as the best tradi-
tions of the office. Every presidential administration should either publicly
embrace them or announce its own set of guidelines.
Perhaps most essential to avoiding a culture in which OLC becomes
merely an advocate of the administration's policy preferences is transparency
149. The President or attorney general also may call upon OLC to assist in other functions
that may include advocacy. See supra note 130.
150. As the Guidelines state, "OLC can help promote public confidence and understand-
ing by publicly announcing its general operating policies and procedures." GUIDELINES, supra
note 16, app. 2 at 1609.
1596 54 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1559 (2007)
Faithfully Executing the Laws
in the specific legal advice that informs executive action, as well as in
the general governing processes and standards. The Guidelines state that
"OLC should publicly disclose its written legal opinions in a timely
manner, absent strong reasons for delay or nondisclosure."'' The Guidelines
describe several values served by a presumption of public disclosure,
beyond the general public accountability that accompanies openness in
government. The likelihood of public disclosure will encourage both the
reality and the appearance of governmental adherence to the rule of law by
deterring "excessive claims of executive authority" and promoting public
confidence that executive branch action actually is taken with regard to
legal constraints. ' The Guidelines note as well that public discourse and
"the development of constitutional meaning" may benefit from the executive's
important voice, valuable perspective, and expertise.'
Of the Guidelines' ten principles, this call for transparency is perhaps
the most controversial, as well as the most susceptible to substantially
different interpretation, even among those who endorse it. The Guidelines
note that the executive branch undoubtedly will possess strong, even
compelling, reasons for keeping some OLC advice confidential. The classic
example is to protect national security interests, such as where the release of
an OLC opinion might reveal the identity of a covert agent. Less obvious
perhaps, OLC also has an interest in not releasing opinions that would
embarrass the administration-or, more to the point, the individual or
agency who requested the advice. More is at stake than political embar-
rassment: "For OLC routinely to release the details of all contemplated
action of dubious legality might deter executive branch actors from seek-
ing OLC advice at sufficiently early stages in policy formulation."'54
Policymakers should not have to fear public disclosure of their hastily
conceived ideas for potentially unlawful action-that is, as long as they
abide by OLC's advice. The public interest is served when government
officials run proposals by OLC, and publication policy must not unduly
deter the seeking of legal advice. Thus, the Guidelines state, "[o]rdinarily,
OLC should honor a requestor's desire to keep confidential any OLC advice
that the proposed executive action would be unlawful, where the requestor
then does not take the action."'55
151. Id. at 1607.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1608.
155. Id. This presumption in favor of confidentiality may be overcome by sufficiently
weighty specific need.
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A hypothetical helps illustrate: Assume that in the immediate wake
of the Oklahoma City bombing, the counsel to the President had asked
OLC to consider several necessarily rough and hurried prepared proposals,
among them whether the government could torture and unilaterally
wiretap the leaders of right-wing militias suspected of planning future
attacks, notwithstanding federal statutes apparently to the contrary. If
OLC advised that the proposed actions would be unlawful and the
White House followed that advice and decided not to pursue the policies,
there ordinarily would be relatively little need to publicly disclose the
request or the response and good reason to keep them confidential. If,
however, the White House acted contrary to OLC advice or if OLC
issued an opinion interpreting the relevant law to allow the torture and
warrantless wiretapping, the public would have a strong interest in
seeing the OLC opinion in an appropriate, timely manner.
The Guidelines describe the need for public disclosure as particularly
strong whenever the executive branch does not fully comply with a fed-
eral statutory requirement. "' Although the Guidelines do not take a
position on the legitimacy of presidential nonenforcement, they note
its "rare" occurrence and call at a "bare minimum" for full public disclosure
and explanation: "[A]bsent the most compelling need for secrecy, any time
the executive branch disregards a federal statutory requirement on consti-
tutional grounds, it should publicly release a clear statement explaining
its deviation."'' 7 The supporting legal analysis "should fully address applica-
ble Supreme Court precedent."'58 As the Guidelines also note, Congress has
enacted a law that requires the attorney general to notify Congress if
the Department of Justice determines either that it will not enforce a statu-
tory provision on the grounds the provision is unconstitutional or that it
will not defend a statute against constitutional challenge.
5 9
The Bush Administration, of course, has not complied with this public
notice standard and generally has operated in extraordinary secrecy.
156. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has investigated whether President
Bush actually had refused to enforce statutory provisions regarding which he had raised
constitutional objections in signing statements. Memorandum from Gary Kepplinger, Gen.
Counsel, GAO to Senators Robert C. Byrd & John Conyers Jr., Presidential Signing Statements
Accompanying the Fiscal Year 2006 Appropriations Acts (June 19, 2007), available at
http://appropriations.senate.gov/News/2007-06-18 -Text -ofGAOOpiniononWhite House-
SigningStatements.pdf. GAO found that Bush had not complied with six of the sample of
nineteen provisions it had selected for its study. Id.
157. GUIDELINES, supra note 16, app. 2 at 1607.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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Its coercive interrogation policy provides one striking example. The
Bush Administration kept secret OLC's determination that the President
had the constitutional authority to violate the federal anti-torture statute.
The public learned of the Torture Opinion only through a leak almost
two years after OLC issued it. During that time, the Opinion was held
out as the definitive legal interpretation to the executive branch as a
whole and was used to silence those who objected to the use of extreme
interrogation techniques.
Given the Bush Administration's propensity to claim that it is
simply engaging in statutory interpretation when it in effect is claiming
the authority to disregard a statute, Congress should amend the current
notification requirement to extend beyond cases in which the executive
branch acknowledges it is refusing to comply with a statute. Presidents
should explain publicly not only when they determine a statute is unconsti-
tutional and should not be enforced, but also whenever they rely upon
the constitutional avoidance canon to interpret a statute. As Trevor
Morrison has explained, the most persuasive justification for allowing
executive branch use of the avoidance canon-which promotes judicial
restraint when used by courts-is to promote constitutional enforcement
by requiring Congress to be clear about its intent when it comes close
to a constitutional line. Executive use of the avoidance canon, like judicial
use, protects constitutional norms by encouraging Congress to deliberate
before coming close to violating them. This justification, which has the
effect of forcing Congress to reconsider legislation, depends entirely on
the executive branch disclosing its concerns to Congress.'
60
But the Bush Administration has relied upon the avoidance doctrine
in secret, depriving Congress of any opportunity to respond with clarifying
legislation. Moreover, if the President refuses even to notify Congress
when he refuses to comply with a statutory requirement, Congress-and
the public-has little ability to monitor the executive branch's legal
compliance and has significant reason for suspicion. President Bush's
frequent use of vague, boilerplate language in signing statements, stating
that he will interpret statutes consistent with his views of presidential
powers, does not provide genuine guidance about whether and how the
President will enforce the provision. The notification regarding either
160. See Morrison, supra note 7; Trevor W. Morrison, Executive Branch Avoidance and the
Need for Congressional Notification, SIDEBAR: ONLINE PUBL. COLUM. L. REV., Feb. 15, 2007,
http://clrsidebar.org/essays/executive-branch-avoidance.
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nonenforcement or the use of the avoidance canon should contain suffi-
cient detail and analysis to truly inform the public.
Beyond the failure in transparency, details gleaned from the scant
public record indicate that the Torture Opinion did not adhere to some
of the other best practices advocated by the Guidelines. For example, OLC
appears to have acted contrary to the Guidelines' suggestion that "[w]hen-
ever time and circumstances permit, OLC should seek the views of all
affected agencies and components of the Department of Justice before
rendering final advice.' '61  OLC apparently either never solicited or
simply ignored the advice of the Department of State and the Criminal
Division of the Department of Justice.'62 Sensitive to such criticisms, OLC's
Replacement Opinion reports that the Criminal Division "concurs"
with its analysis.'63 The Wall Street Journal reported that OLC circulated
drafts of this revised opinion and sought input from the Department of
State as well as the CIA and Department of Defense.'
The Guidelines also caution that "OLC typically should provide legal
advice in advance of executive branch action, and not regarding executive
branch action that already has occurred."'65 Otherwise, OLC will feel
pressure not to opine that executive branch officials have engaged in
unlawful activity. According to news reports, the CIA began using extreme
interrogation methods, including waterboarding and cold cells, several
months before OLC issued the Torture Opinion.'" If the Torture Opinion
instead had concluded that these interrogations violated the federal anti-
torture statute, the interrogators could have faced harsh criminal penalties;
that knowledge could create pressure on OLC to find no violation.
Related to this caution against post hoc advice, the Guidelines encour-
age executive branch "structures, routines and expectations" ".to help ensure
that OLC is consulted, before the fact, regarding any and all substantial
executive branch action of questionable legality.' 67 OLC, for its part,
161. GUIDELINES, supra note 16, app. 2 at 1609.
162. The Washington Post reported that the Torture Opinion was written with input from "a
small group of conservative legal officials at the White House, the Justice Department and the
Defense Department-and ... generally excludled] potential dissenters." R. Jeffrey Smith &
Dan Eggen, Gonzales Helped Set the Course for Detainees, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 2005, at Al.
163. Replacement Opinion, supra note 55, at 2.
164. Jess Bravin, Interrogation Policy Proves Elusive, WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 2004, at A4.
165. GUIDELINES, supra note 16, app. 2 at 1608.
166. See Ross & Esposito, supra note 48 (reporting that harsh methods were used beginning
in March 2002; the Torture Opinion was issued in August 2002). The Guidelines acknowledge
that this problem may be unavoidable for some questions that involve continuing or recurring
executive branch action. GUIDELINES, supra note 16, app. 2 at 1608.
167. Id. at 1609-10.
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"must be attentive to the need for prompt, responsive legal advice that is
not unnecessarily obstructionist." 6 ' OLC's advice often should not end
with saying no to a proposed action, but should help the President and
policymakers achieve objectives through alternative, lawful means. If
instead OLC is perceived as unhelpful and unnecessarily negative, the
President and others in the executive branch might avoid asking OLC
about the legality of strongly desired policies.
CONCLUSION
Public cynicism notwithstanding, it is both possible and necessary for
executive branch lawyers to constrain unlawful executive branch action.
Ultimately, though, the President's own attitude toward the rule of law
will go a long way toward setting the tone for the administration. If the
President desires only a rubberstamp, OLC will have to struggle mightily
to provide an effective check on unlawful action. In addition to being
prepared to say no, therefore, the assistant attorney general for OLC and
other top Department of Justice officials must also be prepared to resign
in the extraordinary event the President persists in acting unlawfully or
demands that OLC legitimize unlawful activity. Even from within the
Bush Administration, some cause for optimism can be found in reports
of internal opposition to extreme interrogation policies, as well as in the
threatened resignation of up to thirty Department of Justice officials if
Bush had persisted in a domestic surveillance program the Department
had determined was unlawful.'69 This is as it should be: Commitment to
the rule of law must not be a partisan issue. Congress, the courts, and the
public should all work to empower principled executive branch legal
advisors-in administrations of both political parties-to safeguard our
constitutional democracy.
168. Id. at 1609 "Although OLC's legal determinations should not seek simply to legitimate
the policy preferences of the administration of which it is a part, OLC must take account
of the administration's goals and assist their accomplishment within the law." Id.
169. See supra note 11.
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APPENDIX 1. GUIDELINES MEMORANDUM
To: Attorney General John Ashcroft, Judge Alberto R. Gonzales, and Acting
Assistant Attorney General Daniel B. Levin
From: Signatories to Attached Document
Re: Attached Principles to Guide the Office of Legal Counsel
Date: December 21, 2004
As President Bush begins his second term in office, we respectfully
offer for your consideration the enclosed set of "Principles to Guide the
Office of Legal Counsel." Prompted in part by concerns about the August
1, 2002 OLC memorandum "Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under
18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A," disclosed last Summer, the undersigned former
OLC attorneys have engaged in a series of conversations about that
memorandum and also more generally about the practices OLC should
follow in advising the President and the Executive Branch on the legality of
contemplated action. In preparing these written guidelines, we in large
part drew upon what we believe are longstanding, desirable OLC practices
in administrations of both political parties. The Office of Legal Counsel
plays a central role in upholding the rule of law in this great nation, and
we take pride in our service there. We stand ready to be of any assistance
in maintaining that important tradition.
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APPENDIX 2. GUIDELINES
PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL
December 21, 2004
The Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) is the Department of Justice
component to which the Attorney General has delegated the function of
providing legal advice to guide the actions of the President and the agen-
cies of the executive branch. OLC's legal determinations are considered
binding on the executive branch, subject to the supervision of the
Attorney General and the ultimate authority of the President. From the
outset of our constitutional system, Presidents have recognized that compli-
ance with their constitutional obligation to act lawfully requires a reliable
source of legal advice. In 1793, Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson, writ-
ing on behalf of President Washington, requested the Supreme Court's
advice regarding the United States' treaty obligations with regard to the
war between Great Britain and France. The Supreme Court declined the
request, in important measure on the grounds that the Constitution vests
responsibility for such legal determinations within the executive branch
itself: "[T]he three departments of government ... being in certain respects
checks upon each other, and our being judges of a court in the last resort,
are considerations which afford strong arguments against the propriety
of our extrajudicially deciding the questions alluded to, especially as the
power given by the Constitution to the President, of calling on the heads
of departments for opinions seems to have been purposely as well as
expressly united to the executive departments." Letter from John Jay
to George Washington, August 8, 1793, quoted in 4 The Founders'
Constitution 258 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner, eds. 1987).
From the Washington Administration through the present, Attorneys
General, and in recent decades the Office of Legal Counsel, have served
as the source of legal determinations regarding the executive's legal
obligations and authorities. The resulting body of law, much of which
is published in volumes entitled Opinions of the Attorney General and
Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel, offers powerful testimony to
the importance of the rule-of-law values that President Washington
sought to secure and to the Department of Justice's profound tradition
of respect for the rule of law. Administrations of both political parties
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have maintained this tradition, which reflects a dedication to the rule of
law that is as significant and as important to the country as that shown
by our courts. As a practical matter, the responsibility for preserving
this tradition cannot rest with OLC alone. It is incumbent upon the
Attorney General and the President to ensure that OLC's advice is
sought on important and close legal questions and that the advice given
reflects the best executive branch traditions. The principles set forth
in this document are based in large part on the longstanding practices
of the Attorney General and the Office of Legal Counsel, across time
and administrations.
I. When providing legal advice to guide contemplated executive branch action,
OLC should provide an accurate and honest appraisal of applicable law,
even if that advice will constrain the administration's pursuit of desired
policies. The advocacy model of lawyering, in which lawyers craft merely
plausible legal arguments to support their clients' desired actions, inade-
quately promotes the President's constitutional obligation to ensure the
legality of executive action.
OLC's core function is to help the President fulfill his constitutional
duty to uphold the Constitution and "take care that the laws be faithfully
executed" in all of the varied work of the executive branch. OLC
provides the legal expertise necessary to ensure the lawfulness of presiden-
tial and executive branch action, including contemplated action that raises
close and difficult questions of law. To fulfill this function appropriately,
OLC must provide advice based on its best understanding of what the
law requires. OLC should not simply provide an advocate's best defense
of contemplated action that OLC actually believes is best viewed as
unlawful. To do so would deprive the President and other executive
branch decisionmakers of critical information and, worse, mislead them
regarding the legality of contemplated action. OLC's tradition of princi-
pled legal analysis and adherence to the rule of law thus is constitutionally
grounded and also best serves the interests of both the public and the
presidency, even though OLC at times will determine that the law
precludes an action that a President strongly desires to take.
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2. OLC's advice should be thorough and forthright, and it should reflect all
legal constraints, including the constitutional authorities of the coordinate
branches of the federal government-the courts and Congress-and
constitutional limits on the exercise of governmental power.
The President is constitutionally obligated to "preserve, protect and
defend" the Constitution in its entirety-not only executive power, but also
judicial and congressional power and constitutional limits on governmen-
tal power-and to enforce federal statutes enacted in accordance with the
Constitution. OLC's advice should reflect all relevant legal constraints.
In addition, regardless of OLC's ultimate legal conclusions concerning
whether proposed executive branch action lawfully may proceed, OLC's
analysis should disclose, and candidly and fairly address, the relevant range
of legal sources and substantial arguments on all sides of the question.
3. OLC's obligation to counsel compliance with the law, and the insufficiency
of the advocacy model, pertain with special force in circumstances where
OLC's advice is unlikely to be subject to review by the courts.
In formulating its best view of what the law requires, OLC always
should be mindful that the President's legal obligations are not limited
to those that are judicially enforceable. In some circumstances, OLC's
advice will guide executive branch action that the courts are unlikely to
review (for example, action unlikely to result in a justiciable case or
controversy) or that the courts likely will review only under a standard
of extreme deference (for example, some questions regarding war powers
and national security). OLC's advice should reflect its best view of all
applicable legal constraints, and not only legal constraints likely to lead
to judicial invalidation of executive branch action. An OLC approach
that instead would equate "lawful" with "likely to escape judicial condem-
nation" would ill serve the President's constitutional duty by failing to
describe all legal constraints and by appearing to condone unlawful action
as long as the President could, in a sense, get away with it. Indeed, the
absence of a litigation threat signals special need for vigilance: In
circumstances in which judicial oversight of executive branch action is
unlikely, the President-and by extension OLC-has a special obligation
to ensure compliance with the law, including respect for the rights of
affected individuals and the constitutional allocation of powers.
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4. OLC's legal analyses, and its processes for reaching legal determinations,
should not simply mirror those of the federal courts, but also should reflect
the institutional traditions and competencies of the executive branch as
well as the views of the President who currently holds office.
As discussed under principle 3, jurisdictional and prudential limita-
tions do not constrain OLC as they do courts, and thus in some instances
OLC appropriately identifies legal limits on executive branch action
that a court would not require. Beyond this, OLC's work should reflect the
fact that OLC is located in the executive branch and serves both the
institution of the presidency and a particular incumbent, democratically
elected President in whom the Constitution vests the executive power.
What follows from this is addressed as well under principle 5. The most
substantial effects include the following: OLC typically adheres to judi-
cial precedent, but that precedent sometimes leaves room for executive inter-
pretive influences, because doctrine at times genuinely is open to more
than one interpretation and at times contemplates an executive branch
interpretive role. Similarly, OLC routinely, and appropriately, considers
sources and understandings of law and fact that the courts often ignore,
such as previous Attorney General and OLC opinions that themselves
reflect the traditions, knowledge and expertise of the executive branch.
Finally, OLC differs from a court in that its responsibilities include
facilitating the work of the executive branch and the objectives of the
President, consistent with the requirements of the law. OLC therefore,
where possible and appropriate, should recommend lawful alternatives to
legally impermissible executive branch proposals. Notwithstanding these
and other significant differences between the work of OLC and the courts,
OLC's legal analyses always should be principled, thorough, forthright,
and not merely instrumental to the President's policy preferences.
5. OLC advice should reflect due respect for the constitutional views of the
courts and Congress (as well as the President). On the very rare occasion
when the executive branch-usually on the advice of OLC--declines fully to
follow a federal statutory requirement, it typically should publicly dis-
close its justification.
OLC's tradition of general adherence to judicial (especially Supreme
Court) precedent and federal statutes reflects appropriate executive
branch respect for the coordinate branches of the federal government.
On very rare occasion, however, Presidents, often with the advice of OLC,
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appropriately act on their own understanding of constitutional meaning
(just as Congress at times enacts laws based on its own constitutional
views). To begin with relatively uncontroversial examples, Presidents
at times veto bills they believe are unconstitutional and pardon indi-
viduals for violating what Presidents believe are unconstitutional statutes,
even when the Court would uphold the statute or the conviction against
constitutional challenge. Far more controversial are rare cases in which
Presidents decide to refuse to enforce or otherwise comply with laws
they deem unconstitutional, either on their face or in some applications.
The precise contours of presidential power in such contexts are the
subject of some debate and beyond the scope of this document. The
need for transparency regarding interbranch disagreements, however,
should be beyond dispute. At a bare minimum, OLC advice should
fully address applicable Supreme Court precedent, and, absent the most
compelling need for secrecy, any time the executive branch disregards
a federal statutory requirement on constitutional grounds, it should
publicly release a clear statement explaining its deviation. Absent
transparency and clarity, client agencies might experience difficulty
understanding and applying such legal advice, and the public and
Congress would be unable adequately to assess the lawfulness of execu-
tive branch action. Indeed, federal law currently requires the Attorney
General to notify Congress if the Department of Justice determines
either that it will not enforce a provision of law on the grounds that it
is unconstitutional or that it will not defend a provision of law against
constitutional challenge.
6. OLC should publicly disclose its written legal opinions in a timely manner,
absent strong reasons for delay or nondisclosure.
OLC should follow a presumption in favor of timely publication of its
written legal opinions. Such disclosure helps to ensure executive branch
adherence to the rule of law and guard against excessive claims of execu-
tive authority. Transparency also promotes confidence in the lawfulness
of governmental action. Making executive branch law available to the
public also adds an important voice to the development of constitutional
meaning-in the courts as well as among academics, other commentators,
and the public more generally-and a particularly valuable perspective on
legal issues regarding which the executive branch possesses relevant exper-
tise. There nonetheless will exist some legal advice that properly should
remain confidential, most notably, some advice regarding classified and
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some other national security matters. OLC should consider the views
regarding disclosure of the client agency that requested the advice.
Ordinarily, OLC should honor a requestor's desire to keep confidential any
OLC advice that the proposed executive action would be unlawful, where
the requestor then does not take the action. For OLC routinely to release
the details of all contemplated action of dubious legality might deter
executive branch actors from seeking OLC advice at sufficiently early stages
in policy formation. In all events, OLC should in each administration
consider the circumstances in which advice should be kept confidential,
with a presumption in favor of publication, and publication policy and
practice should not vary substantially from administration to administra-
tion. The values of transparency and accountability remain constant, as do
any existing legitimate rationales for secret executive branch law. Finally,
as discussed in principle 5, Presidents, and by extension OLC, bear a special
responsibility to disclose publicly and explain any actions that conflict
with federal statutory requirements.
7. OLC should maintain internal systems and practices to help ensure that
OLC's legal advice is of the highest possible quality and represents the best
possible view of the law.
OLC systems and processes can help maintain high legal standards,
avoid errors, and safeguard against tendencies toward potentially exces-
sive claims of executive authority. At the outset, OLC should be careful
about the form of requests for advice. Whenever possible, agency requests
should be in writing, should include the requesting agency's own best
legal views as well as any relevant materials and information, and should
be as specific as circumstances allow. Where OLC determines that advice
of a more generally applicable nature would be helpful and appropriate, it
should take special care to consider the implications for its advice in all
foreseeable potential applications. Also, OLC typically should provide
legal advice in advance of executive branch action, and not regarding
executive branch action that already has occurred; legal "advice" after
the fact is subject to strong pressures to follow an advocacy model,
which is an appropriate activity for some components of the Department
of Justice but not usually for OLC (though this tension may be
unavoidable in some cases involving continuing or potentially recurring
executive branch action). OLC should recruit and retain attorneys of
the highest integrity and abilities. OLC should afford .due respect for the
precedential value of OLC opinions from administrations of both
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parties; although OLC's current best view of the law sometimes will
require repudiation of OLC precedent, OLC should never disregard
precedent without careful consideration and detailed explanation.
Ordinarily OLC legal advice should be subject to multiple layers of scrutiny
and approval; one such mechanism used effectively at times is a "two
deputy rule" that requires at least two supervising deputies to review and
clear all OLC advice. Finally, OLC can help promote public confidence
and understanding by publicly announcing its general operating policies
and procedures.
8. Whenever time and circumstances permit, OLC should seek the views of
all affected agencies and components of the Department of Justice before
rendering final advice.
The involvement of affected entities serves as an additional check
against erroneous reasoning by ensuring that all views and relevant
information are considered. Administrative coordination allows OLC
to avail itself of the substantive expertise of the various components of
the executive branch and to avoid overlooking potentially important
consequences before rendering advice. It helps to ensure that legal
pronouncements will have no broader effect than necessary to resolve
the question at hand. Finally, it allows OLC to respond to all serious
arguments and thus avoid the need for reconsideration.
9. OLC should strive to maintain good working relationships with its client
agencies, and especially the White House Counsel's Office, to help ensure
that OLC is consulted, before the fact, regarding any and all substantial
executive branch action of questionable legality.
Although OLC's legal determinations should not seek simply to
legitimate the policy preferences of the administration of which it is a
part, OLC must take account of the administration's goals and assist
their accomplishment within the law. To operate effectively, OLC
must be attentive to the need for prompt, responsive legal advice that
is not unnecessarily obstructionist. Thus, when OLC concludes that an
administration proposal is impermissible, it is appropriate for OLC to go
on to suggest modifications that would cure the defect, and OLC should
stand ready to work with the administration to craft lawful alternatives.
Executive branch officials nonetheless may be tempted to avoid bringing
to OLC's attention strongly desired policies of questionable legality.
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Structures, routines and expectations should ensure that OLC is con-
sulted on all major executive branch initiatives and activities that raise
significant legal questions. Public attention to when and how OLC
generally functions within a particular administration also can help ensure
appropriate OLC involvement.
10. OLC should be clear whenever it intends its advice to fall outside of OLC's
typical role as the source of legal determinations that are binding within
the executive branch.
OLC sometimes provides legal advice that is not intended to inform
the formulation of executive branch policy or action, and in some such
circumstances an advocacy model may be appropriate. One common
example: OLC sometimes assists the Solicitor General and the litigating
components of the Department of Justice in developing arguments for
presentation to a court, including in the defense of congressional stat-
utes. The Department of Justice typically follows a practice of defend-
ing an act of Congress against constitutional challenge as long as a
reasonable argument can be made in its defense (even if that argument is
not the best view of the law). In this context, OLC appropriately may
employ advocacy-based modes of analysis. OLC should ensure, however,
that all involved understand whenever OLC is acting outside of its typical
stance, and that its views in such cases should not be taken as authoritative,
binding advice as to the executive branch's legal obligations. Client
agencies expect OLC to provide its best view of applicable legal constraints
and if OLC acts otherwise without adequate warning, it risks prompting
unlawful executive branch action.
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